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IV. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT. 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(j). This case was transferred by the Utah Supreme Court to this Court, pursuant to 
an Order dated February 7, 2008. 
V. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW. 
1. Did the District Court err in granting defendants' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment and holding, as a matter of law, that prior probate court rulings 
authorized defendants to each receive from the estate of the parties5 father $349,729.85 in 
Hamilton Brothers Electric, Inc. stock, when the probate court's rulings limited each of 
their distributions to, at most, $99,840.00 in estate assets? (R. at 1085-1160, 1378-86, 
1391-93.) 
"Because a grant of summary judgment by definition involves conclusions of law, 
we afford no deference to the District Court's decision and review it for correctness." 
Berry v. Greater Park City Co.. 2007 UT 87, If 8, 171 P.3d 442. 
2. Did the District Court err in granting defendants' Motion to Enforce Partial 
Settlement Agreement, holding, as a matter of law, that plaintiff and defendants entered 
into an oral, partial settlement agreement, and, on that basis, dismissing plaintiffs 
monetary claims with prejudice, even though defendants offered no admissible evidence 
that the alleged settlement agreement was offered or accepted by plaintiff; the only 
admissible evidence submitted on the subject denied the existence of any settlement 
agreement; and, at the very least, the evidence before the District Court indicated an 
#245954 v2 sic 
1 
intent to defer legal obligations until a signed writing was made, which never happened? 
(R. at 1563-81, 1724-35, 1911-12.) 
"In arriving at its decision to enforce the settlement agreement, the trial court 
concluded that [the parties] had a meeting of the minds and that the settlement agreement 
was unambiguous. As to these issues, whether a contract exists between the parties is a 
question of law which we review for correctness. In addition, whether contractual 
language is ambiguous is a question of law also reviewed for correctness." John Deere 
Co. v. A&H Equip., Inc., 876 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
3. Did the District Court err in precluding plaintiff from presenting at a trial 
her responses to defendants' affirmative defenses on the ground that such responses were 
not contained in plaintiff s complaint? (R. at 1674-1713, 1854-87, 1904-09.) 
Interpretations of procedural rules and determinations as to "the sufficiency or 
effect of the pleadings" present "question[s] of law," the resolution of which are afforded 
no deference and are reviewed for correctness. Richardson v. Grand Central Corp., 572 
P.2d 395, 397 (Utah 1977); see also Ostler v. Buhler, 1999 UT 99, U 5, 989 P.2d 1073; 
Board of Ed. of Granite Sch. Dist. v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030, 1033 (Utah 
1983); Farr v. Brinkerhoff, 829 P.2d 117, 119 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) . 
4. Did the District Court err in denying plaintiff permission to file a reply to 
defendants' answer, by which plaintiff sought to plead her response to defendants' 
affirmative defenses, even though the substance of plaintiff s proposed reply had, for 
almost a year and without objection from defendants, been part of the litigation, and 
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defendants' counsel agreed that plaintiff need not incorporate into her pleadings the 
subject matter of her proposed reply? (R. at 1674-1713, 1854-87, 1904-09.) 
The District Court's ruling on a motion for an order to file a reply should be 
reviewed under the standard of review applicable to rulings on motions to amend 
pleadings, which is the abuse of discretion standard. Utah R. Civ. P. 7(a) ("[T]he court 
may order a reply to an answer . . . . " (emphasis added)); Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v. 
Harrison, 2003 UT 14, f 23, 70 P.3d 35. 
VI. DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY. 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations, 
the interpretation of which is determinative or of central importance to the appeal. 
VII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND 
DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW. 
Amber McKelvey ("Amber") commenced this action on September 29, 2004, 
individually and derivatively, based upon her ownership of shares of Hamilton Brothers 
Electric, Inc. ("HBE") stock. (R. at 1-15.) Amber claims that her brothers, defendants 
Stuart Hamilton ("Stuart") and Vincent Hamilton ("Vincent") (collectively "Hamiltons"), 
who manage HBE and are the only other shareholders of HBE, breached their fiduciary 
duties by depriving her of the benefits of her shareholder status and misappropriating 
corporate assets for their own personal benefit. (R. at 1-15.) On March 20, 2006, Amber 
filed her Second Amended Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint with leave of the 
District Court. (R. at 555-57, 560-575.) The Fifth Claim for Relief in that pleading 
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sought a declaration that Amber's shares of HBE stock equate to 1/3 ownership of HBE, 
and that the Hamiltons own no more than 2/3 of HBE. (R. at 565.) 
On November 24, 2006, the Hamiltons filed a Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on Amber's Fifth Claim for Relief. (R. at 612-14.) The Hamiltons' motion 
was based solely on affirmative defenses: two statutes of limitations and the res judicata 
effect of certain rulings from the probate case of their father's Estate, the Matter of the 
Estate of Gordon Dean Hamilton, Civil No. 903400101, in the Fourth Judicial District 
Court, Utah County, State of Utah ("Gordon Hamilton Matter"). (R. at 613, 615-700.) 
The Hamiltons claimed that such rulings authorized them to give themselves more HBE 
stock than Amber had. In opposition to the motion, one of Amber's arguments was that, 
if in fact rulings from the Gordon Hamilton Matter authorized the Hamiltons to receive 
more HBE shares than Amber had, the Hamiltons procured such rulings by fraud, 
nullifying such authorization. (R. at 1102-04 (citing Pepper v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 
N.A., 801 P.2d 144, 148 (Utah 1990)).) As a matter of law, the District Court rejected 
the Hamiltons' res judicata argument, but held that the rulings from the Gordon Hamilton 
Matter authorized the Hamiltons to grant themselves more stock than Amber received. 
(R. at 1392-93, 1906.) The District Court expressly left open the issue of whether the 
Hamiltons fraudulently procured such rulings. (R. at 1384.) 
On August 2, 2007, the Hamilton's moved the District Court to establish, as a 
matter of law, and enforce an alleged oral, partial settlement agreement purportedly made 
by the parties' attorneys in early 2006. (R. at 1483-85.) According to the Hamiltons, 
their lead counsel had agreed with Amber's counsel that Amber would dismiss with 
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prejudice all her claims, except her claim for a declaration as to the parties' respective 
percentages of HBE ownership, in exchange for the Hamiltons' agreement to share the 
cost of an appraisal of HBE, with no commitment to either buy or sell HBE stock based 
on the appraisal. (R. at 1486-1556.) The District Court granted the Hamilton's motion 
and dismissed with prejudice Amber's monetary claims. (R. at 1911-12.) 
On October 19, 2007, Amber filed her Motion in Limine Regarding Evidence and 
Argument Responsive to Defendants' Affirmative Defenses, and, If Necessary, Motion 
for Order to File Reply to Answer. (R. at 1674-99.) Amber's motion was in response to 
statements made by the Hamiltons' counsel during the October 15, 2007 hearing on the 
Hamiltons' Motion to Enforce Partial Settlement Agreement, in which he argued that 
Amber should be precluded from presenting evidence and argument of the Hamilton's 
fraudulent procurement of rulings in the Gordon Hamilton Matter, because Amber's 
complaint makes no mention of it. (R. at 1924, pp. 41-42.) Previously, the Hamiltons' 
counsel had agreed that Amber need not incorporate her fraudulent procurement 
argument in her complaint, because it is solely responsive to the Hamiltons' affirmative 
defenses to Amber's claim to be declared a 1/3 owner of HBE. (R. at 1714-17, 1719, 
1722.) Denying Amber's motion, the District Court held that Amber was precluded from 
asserting her fraudulent procurement argument because it was absent from her pleadings, 
and the District Court denied Amber leave to file a new pleading - a reply to the 
Hamiltons' answer - to articulate her fraudulent procurement argument. (R. at 1906.) 
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B. STATEMENT OF FACTS.1 
1. The Hamilton's Acquisition Of More Shares Of HBE Stock 
Than Amber Received Was Authorized By No Ruling In The 
Gordon Hamilton Matter. 
Amber and the Hamiltons are siblings and the sole shareholders of a business, 
HBE, founded and owned by their late father, Gordon Hamilton. (R. at 1385-86.) Amber 
owns 1,683 shares of HBE stock. (R. at 705.) Amber has never claimed any more HBE 
shares. Instead, Amber claims that the Hamiltons should have each received no more 
HBE stock than she has and, if they received more, it was the result of self-dealing, either 
as personal representatives of their father's probated Estate or as directors and officers of 
HBE.2 (R. at 565.) 
In sworn testimony, Stuart and Vincent did not disagree with Amber's position 
that the rulings in the Gordon Hamilton Matter were bereft of any authorization for their 
receipt of more HBE shares than Amber received. Stuart candidly testified that he had no 
explanation for how he allegedly ended up with more HBE shares than Amber. (R. at 
1012-14.) In his deposition, Vincent testified that the rulings in the Gordon Hamilton 
Matter authorized the Hamiltons to receive no more HBE stock than Amber received -
"On summary judgment we review the facts and inferences in favor of the 
nonmoving party," who in this case is Amber. Whaley v. Park City Mun. Corp., 2008 
UT App 234, TI28, 190P.3dl. 
2
 See Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-711 ("If the exercise of power concerning the estate 
is improper, the personal representative is liable to interested persons for damage or loss 
resulting from breach of his fiduciary duty to the same extent as a trustee of an express 
trust."); Bingham Consol. Co. v. Groesbeck 2004 UT App 434, H 22, 105 P.3d 365 
("'Directors and officers have a fiduciary duty of loyalty to their corporation and its 
stockholders "' (quoting Nicholson v. Evans, 642 P.2d 727, 730 (Utah 1982)). 
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1,683 shares each - but he and Stuart received additional shares by: (1) using assets of 
the Gordon Hamilton Estate ("Estate") to purchase the distributions of Amber and the 
Hamilton's sisters, Lisa Kunz ("Lisa") and Tonua Hamilton ("Tonua"), and exchanging 
those distributions for HBE stock; and (2) purchasing shares from the Estate with their 
personal representatives fee. (R. at 1052-58.) The Hamiltons' attorneys in this case and 
the District Court are the only ones who assert that the Hamiltons received all of their 
alleged 8,317 shares of HBE stock pursuant to rulings in the Gordon Hamilton Matter. 
(R. at 1380, 1391, 1906, 1923 pp. 24, 29-30.) Evaluation of the various positions 
regarding how the Hamiltons allegedly received their HBE stock requires a review of 
events surrounding the Gordon Hamilton Matter. 
The Gordon Hamilton Matter was commenced by the Hamiltons on March 27, 
1990, shortly after Gordon Hamilton's death on January 17, 1990. (R. at 855.) The 
probate proceedings relevant to this case were presided over by Judge Guy Burningham. 
(R. at 762-75, 813-15, 883, 926, 972.) 
Central to the Gordon Hamilton Matter was Gordon Hamilton's Last Will and 
Testament ("Will"), in which he directed that the Hamiltons act as his Estate's personal 
representatives and that his property "be divided among my five children, share and share 
alike, per stirpes." (R. at 885-88.) Gordon Hamilton's five children are Amber, Stuart, 
Vincent, Lisa, and Tonua. (R. at 794.) 
In accordance with the Will, the Hamiltons were appointed as personal 
representatives of the Estate on April 4, 1990. (R. at 860, 882, 888.) Thus, the 
Hamiltons assumed fiduciary duties to their sisters, as well as the duty assigned in the 
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Will to "make the shares equal." (R. at 882.) In addition, the Hamiltons occupied 
fiduciary positions as directors and officers of HBE. Both were HBE directors, Stuart 
served as HBE's president, and Vincent was HBE's vice president, treasurer, and 
corporate secretary. (R. at 725, 738, 743.) In contrast, Amber held no position with 
HBE. (R. at 794, 876.) 
The Estate included all outstanding stock of HBE. (R. at 870, 892-98.) HBE was 
authorized to issue a total of 50,000 shares. (R. at 893.) On April 1, 1975, HBE issued, 
and Gordon Hamilton subscribed to purchase, 10,000 shares of HBE stock. (R. at 890.) 
On March 15, 1991, the Hamiltons filed a proposed Distribution in the Gordon 
Hamilton Matter. (R. at 827-45.) According to the Distribution, all five heirs were to 
share equally in all available Estate property, including HBE stock, which the Hamiltons 
proposed to give each heir in 2,000 share amounts. (R. at 840.) 
On January 6, 1993, Amber and Lisa filed a Petition for Order Removing Personal 
Representatives, for Appointment of New Personal Representatives, and for an Order of 
Restitution. (R. at 817-25.) One of the grounds for the petition was the Hamiltons' 
"fail[ure] to distribute the stock of the corporation known as Hamilton Brother Electric, 
Inc. (20% to each of the five heirs as set forth in the Will)/' as they represented they 
would in their March 15, 1991 Distribution. (R. at 824, 1077.) In their March 5, 1993 
opposition, the Hamiltons explained that they had not distributed shares of HBE stock 
because of "an IRS tax audit of the Estate and various other lawsuits." (R. at 810.) 
On December 21, 1993, the Hamiltons filed a Motion for Interim Distribution in 
Kind. (R. at 777-95.) Included was a tentative accounting of the Estate's assets and 
8 
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liabilities and two alternative proposals for distributions to Amber and her sisters. (R. at 
778-92.) Neither proposal contemplated the distribution of HBE shares to the three 
sisters. (R. at 778-79.) Instead, both proposals assumed that the sisters would opt for 
either cash or a mix of real property and cash. (R. at 778-79, 869.) Lisa and Tonua opted 
for cash distributions. (R. at 864, 866-67, 970-71.) 
Unlike Lisa and Tonua, Amber opted to receive her entire distribution in the form 
of HBE stock. (R. at 705, 868, 971-72.) On December 27, 1993, Amber withdrew from 
the removal petition because she "settled out of Court with Stuart G. Hamilton and 
Vincent C. Hamilton concerning the Gordon D. Hamilton Estate[ t]o continue become 
[sic] 1/3 (one third) partner with them." (R. at 815, 868, 1072, 1077.) 
The next day, Judge Bumingham held a hearing on Lisa's removal petition and the 
Hamiltons' distribution motion, and he acknowledged the terms of Amber's withdrawal 
from the removal petition. (R. at 762-75, 815.) Judge Burningham did so by grouping 
Amber with the Hamiltons as having "personal liability" to pay off cash distributions to 
Lisa and Tonua. (R. at 773.) But for the terms of Amber's withdrawal - that she be "1/3 
(one third) partners with them" - Judge Burningham would have had no basis to assign 
"personal liability" to Amber along with the Hamiltons. (R. at 1072.) The Hamiltons' 
counsel did not take issue with Judge Burningham's acknowledgement of Amber's 1/3 
partnership with the Hamiltons. (R. at 762-75.) 
3
 Based upon its review of the docket in the Gordon Hamilton Matter between 
December 21, 1993 and January 21, 1994, the District Court in this case found that 
Amber's withdrawal from the petition was never received by Judge Burningham. (R. at 
1381.) Although the form which Amber's withdrawal took - a December 27, 1993 faxed 
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Also during the December 28, 1993 hearing, Judge Burningham adopted a plan of 
distribution of the Estate's assets, even though an appraisal of HBE had only been made 
available that day. (R. at 746-60, 814.) Aside from recognizing Amber's 1/3 partnership 
with the Hamiltons, however, neither the transcript of the hearing, which is only partial, 
nor Judge Burningham's minute entry shed light on the disposition of HBE stock. (R. at 
762-75, 813-15.) The details are contained in later findings, conclusions and an order, 
which the Hamiltons prepared at the direction of Judge Burningham. (R. at 762, 813.) 
Soon after the December 28 hearing, the Hamiltons met as directors and officers 
of HBE to issue Amber shares of HBE stock. (R. at 743.) Amber was neither notified of 
the meeting, nor did she attend. (R. at 1077.) According to the meeting minutes, both 
Hamiltons were present and voted unanimously to "cancel" all of the outstanding shares 
of HBE stock, which were the 10,000 shares held by the Estate, and to issue 1,683 shares 
of HBE stock to Amber "[b]y court order in the Estate matters of Gordon D. Hamilton." 
(R. at 696, 743.) On January 12, 1994, a stock certificate for Amber's shares was issued. 
(R. at 705.) 
Although the minutes go on to provide that the Hamiltons each be issued 4,158.5 
shares (R. at 743), the Hamiltons have taken the position in this case, in sworn 
interrogatory responses, that they received no HBE shares until February 20, 1994. (R. at 
726-27, 739-40.) The effect of the January 6, 1994 HBE meeting and the Hamiltons' 
letter - was not referenced in the court docket, the withdrawal and the 1/3 ownership 
condition that Amber placed upon her withdrawal was expressly acknowledged by Judge 
Burningham on the transcript of the December 28, 1993 hearing and in Judge 
Burnignham's December 28, 1993 minute entry. (R. at 773, 815.) 
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sworn interrogatory responses is that, from January 6, 1994, until February 20, 1994, 
Amber was the sole HBE shareholder, and her shares were the only outstanding shares of 
HBE stock. (R. at 705.) 
Thereafter, the Hamiltons submitted two documents to reflect Judge Burningham's 
December 28, 1993 rulings. Specifically, the Hamiltons submitted Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law ("FFCL") and an Order Denying Petition to Remove the Personal 
Representatives and Granting Interim Distribution ("Order"). (R. at 862-83, 967-72.) 
The Order was expressly predicated on the FFCL. (R. at 967.) Both were entered by 
Judge Burningham on January 21, 1994. (R. at 862-83, 967-72.) 
The FFCL listed all of the assets and all of the expenses of the Estate. (R. at 870.) 
The FFCL provided that the "Total Gross Estate" was worth $1,957,242, including 
$841,000 for "Hamilton Brothers Electric Stock." (R. at 870.) From the Total Gross 
Estate had to be deducted $1,065,577 in "Total Expenses and Reserves."4 (R. at 870.) 
After deducting expenses and reserves from the Total Gross Estate, the FFCL 
provided that the "net Estate, available for distribution" was $891,665, "or the sum of 
$178,333 for each heir." (R. at 869.) The FFCL further indicated that $53,492 of the 
Estate's insurance proceeds, household goods, and cash had already been received by 
each heir, making $124,841 of assets available for each heir ($178,333 - $53,492 = 
$124,841). (R. at 780, 869-70, 1302.) 
4
 The FFCL identified $128,500 in "[rjeserves for tax audit, attorney's fees and 
appraisal fees," and any unexpended amounts of the reserves were to be equally 
distributed to the five heirs. (R. at 864-65, 870, 969.) There is no evidence of any 
unexpended reserves. 
11 
#245954 v2 sic 
According to the FFCL, however, each sister's total share was increased from 
$178,333 to $195,000. (R. at 868-69, 1302.) In response to an objection to their 
proposed FFCL and Order, the Hamiltons explained that "[t]he Personal Representatives 
have very generously offered the three sisters a bonus not shared by the Personal 
Representatives in actual value." (R. at 918.) Starting with $195,000 instead of 
$178,333 allowed the sisters to receive $141,508 in Estate assets after deducting the 
$53,492 of assets that each heir had previously received. (R. at 867-68, 918, 1302.) 
Amber elected to receive every penny of her $141,508 distribution in the form of 
HBE stock. (R. at 868.) "[A]t the rate of $84.10 per share," $141,508 equated to 1,683 
shares of HBE stock. (R. at 868.) Thus, Amber used the entire amount of her 1/5 
distribution to acquire HBE shares and, at most, such amount equated to no more than 
1,683 shares. (R. at 868, 972.) 
When it came to Lisa and Tonua, who opted for cash distributions, the FFCL and 
Order directed the Hamiltons to immediately pay Lisa and Tonua $75,000 in cash, or 
$37,500 each. (R. at 867, 971.) In addition, the FFCL and the Order required the 
Hamiltons to sell six of the Estate's eight real properties and use the sales proceeds to 
satisfy the $104,008 remainders of Lisa's and Tonua's $141,508 shares, plus interest at 
6% per annum.5 (R. at 866-67, 870-71, 970-71.) 
The Estate's other two real properties consisted of a $235,750 "House, Lots 20 
and 21," a life estate in which went to Gordon Hamilton's widow, and a $170,000 
property, which the Estate was to convey to HBE. (R. at 792, 844, 863-65, 870-71, 969-
70.) 
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Although the Hamiltons were each entitled to a distribution of no more than 1/5 
the net value of the Estate, less the $53,492 they had each previously received, neither the 
FFCL nor the Order they prepared identified the form that such distributions would take 
or the amounts. Instead, the FFCL and the Order provided that "[a]ll other property of 
the Estate . . . are [sic] to be awarded to [the Hamiltons]." (R. at 863-65, 969.) 
The Hamiltons, however, represented what their distributions would be in a 
January 18, 1994 filing submitted to urge Judge Burningham to adopt their proposed 
FFCL and Order over Lisa's objections. (R. at 918, 926.) In that filing, the Hamiltons 
represented that, due to the "very generous[ bonus] offered the three sisters . . . not shared 
by the Personal Representatives," they would each receive only $99,840 in Estate assets. 
(R. at 918, 1302.) Amber relied on the Hamiltons' representations in their January 18, 
1994 filing. (R. at 1076.) 
Thereafter, the Hamiltons proceeded to take much more than $99,840 of HBE 
stock. According to their interrogatory answers, the Hamiltons each "received 4,158.5 
shares on February 20, 1994" from "[their] father Gordon Dean Hamilton's Estate." (R. 
at 726-27, 739-40.) In addition, the Hamiltons took for themselves the $85,000 
"Commercial Lot on South Main" that the FFCL and the Order directed them to sell to 
satisfy Lisa's and Tonua's distributions. (R. at 866-67, 870, 971, 998-99, 1010, 1050-
51.) 
The Hamiltons' 8,317 shares represent over triple the value that the FFCL and the 
Order authorized them to receive. According to the FFCL, each HBE share was worth 
$84.10. (R. at 868.) At $84.10/share, Stuart's and Vincent's receipt of 4,158.5 shares 
13 
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equated to $349,729.85 in value. Combined with the $53,492 that they each received 
prior to the FFCL and the Order and the $85,000 "Commercial Lot on South Main," 
Stuart's and Vincent's claimed $349,729.85 in HBE stock gave each a $445,721.85 
distribution. That amount is 228% of the $195,000 that Judge Burningham allowed 
Amber and her sisters to receive; 291% of the $153,332 amount ($99,840 + $53,492) that 
the Hamiltons represented they each would receive; and nearly half of the $891,665 that 
the FFCL established as "the net Estate, available for distribution" to all five heirs. (R. at 
869,918.) 
The Hamiltons admitted under oath that their acquisition of more HBE stock than 
Amber was outside the FFCL and the Order. During his deposition, Stuart admitted that 
he and Vincent were entitled to no more than 1/5 of the net value of the Estate; that the 
number of shares that equate to 1/5 of the net value was 1,683 shares; and that Judge 
Burningham nowhere authorized Vincent and Stuart to receive 4,158.50 shares. (R. at 
1013-14, 1016.) Under those circumstances, Stuart was unable to explain how he and 
Vincent ended up with more HBE stock than Amber: 
Q. I just would like you to explain the basis of your 
understanding that under this document you were entitled to 
4,158.5 shares and that represented one-fifth of the value of 
your father's Estate? 
A. I don't know. 
(R. at 1012 (emphasis added).) 
According to Vincent, the Hamiltons received their 1/5 (less the $53,492 they each 
had already received) in the form of 1,683 shares of HBE stock, just like Amber: 
#245954 v2 sic 
14 
Q. When was it that you first became an owner of 
Hamilton Brothers Electric, Inc.'s stock? 
A. I believe it was somewhere in January of '94. 
Q. How many shares did you receive in January of 1994? 
A. Originally, it was 1,683 . . . . 
Q. Do you have a document that memorializes your initial 
receipt of 1,683 shares? 
A. The conclusions of law by Judge Burningham stated 
that each of us receive 1/5 of the remainder, and that was 
141,508. The stock was worth $84.10, so that originally gave 
me and Stuart, and if Amber chose to go into the business, her 
stock was 1,683. 
(R. at 1058.) 
Vincent explained that the Hamiltons acquired additional shares with a $134,540 
personal representatives fee that the FFCL allowed them to share (R. at 873), and they 
used the proceeds from sales of the Estate's realty to "purchase[]" Lisa's and Tonua's 
distributions from the Estate, which somehow allowed the Hamiltons to buy the rest of 
their HBE stock: 
A And then the judge turned around and gave the 
remainders of the properties for us to sell. The money that 
was received off that essentially bought Lisa and Tonua's 
share of 141,508, which we took in stock. And our executor 
fees, I think were [$134,540], something like that. 
(R. at 1052-58.) Even though Vincent was certainly in a position to know how he and 
Stuart acquired their stock, the Hamiltons' counsel in this case dismissed Vincent's 
testimony is a "misconception," and they insist that what really happened is that the 
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Hamiltons received all their HBE stock through the FFCL and the Order. (R. at 1296, 
1923 pp. 29-30.) 
If, as Vincent testified, the Hamiltons acquired Lisa's and Tonua's distributions 
and used those distributions, plus their shared $134,540 personal representatives fee, to 
buy stock from the Estate, those transactions would be void under HBE's Bylaws. 
Article VIII of the HBE Bylaws contained a stock transfer restriction intended to give 
shareholders the ability to maintain their ownership percentage. (R. at 947.) Under 
HBE's Bylaws, the Estate was prohibited from selling its shares of HBE stock in 
exchange for the Hamiltons' personal representatives fee or the distributions owed by the 
Estate to Lisa and Tonua, without offering the Estate's HBE stock, first, to HBE and, 
second, to Amber.6 (R. at 947.) At no time did the Hamiltons, as personal 
representatives of the Estate, offer to HBE or Amber the shares they intended to 
exchange for their personal representatives fee that the Estate owed to the Hamiltons or 
the distributions that the Estate owed to Lisa and Tonua. (R. at 1056, 1076.) 
Accordingly, the Hamiltons' acquisition of HBE shares, in the manner explained by 
Vincent, was void ab initio. 
2. Amber's Counsel Never Entered Into The Alleged Partial 
Settlement Agreement. 
On August 2, 2007, the Hamilton's filed their Motion to Enforce Partial 
Settlement Agreement, in which they asked the District Court to establish and enforce an 
6
 Stock transfer restrictions imposed by corporate bylaws are "binding" and "the 
stockholders of [HBE] would have no choice but to comply with the terms of the 
restriction." K&T Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 627 (Utah 1994). 
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alleged oral, partial settlement agreement purportedly made by the parties' attorneys in 
early 2006. (R. at 1483-85.) According to the Hamiltons, the parties agreed that Amber 
would dismiss with prejudice all her claims, except her claim to determine her percentage 
ownership in HBE, in exchange for nothing more than the Hamiltons' agreement to share 
the costs of a valuation of HBE. (R. at 1486-1556.) 
The Hamiltons offered no signed settlement agreement, no document authored by 
Amber or Amber's attorney evidencing any settlement agreement, and no testimony that 
a settlement agreement was made. In contrast, Amber submitted the affidavit of her 
former attorney, Benson Hathaway, with whom the Hamiltons' attorney, Mark Morris, 
allegedly made the "partial settlement agreement." (R. at 1558-62.) In his affidavit, Mr. 
Hathaway categorically denied entering into any such settlement agreement. (R. at 1559-
60.) 
To support the alleged settlement agreement refuted in the Hathaway affidavit, the 
Hamiltons offered correspondence from their own attorney; equivocal correspondence 
from Mr. Hathaway; an unsigned settlement agreement; and the parties' actions allegedly 
"in accordance with the partial settlement agreement." (R. at 1516-1537.) Far from 
overcoming the Hathaway affidavit, the evidence before the District Court made clear: 
(1) that until Mr. Hathaway received Mr. Morris' draft settlement agreement, which Mr. 
Hathaway expressly rejected, Mr. Hathaway reasonably understood that any settlement 
would include a buyout of shares based on a binding joint appraisal and judicial 
determination of ownership percentages; (2) until Mr. Morris sent his draft settlement 
agreement, there was no mention of Amber dismissing with prejudice her monetary 
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claims, particularly without a commitment from the Hamiltons for a buyout of shares; 
and (3) the intention was clearly manifested that legal obligations between the parties 
would be deferred until a signed writing was made, which never happened. 
The first letter submitted by the Hamiltons was a February 24, 2006 letter from 
Mr. Morris to Mr. Hathaway. The letter, in pertinent part, provides: 
Finally, I would like to clarify the proposal you suggested to 
me on the telephone a couple of weeks ago, and make sure I 
understand it. I believe you indicated that you wanted to 
jointly agree on a business valuation expert who could render 
an opinion on the value of Hamilton Brothers Electric, the 
cost of which would be shared by our clients. You also 
indicated that you would be willing to limit the issues now 
before the court solely to the issue of what Ms. McKelvey's 
percentage ownership is. If I understand it correctly, do you 
contemplate forwarding me a stipulation and order consistent 
with that proposal? As I indicated to you on the telephone, 
my clients agree to this proposal. 
I look forward to continuing to work with you to resolve our 
clients' differences. 
(R. at 1536-37.) Based upon the contents of this letter, the District Court held, as a 
matter of law, that an enforceable settlement agreement had been formed by February 24, 
2006. (R. at 1727.) The Hamiltons, however, submitted no affidavit testimony averring 
to the truth of the matters asserted in this letter. 
The next letter the Hamiltons submitted was Mr. Hathaway's March 1, 2006 letter 
to Mr. Morris, in which Mr. Hathaway "follow[ed] up on our conversation regarding an 
approach toward resolving the two pieces of the pending litigation" - the two pieces 
being Amber's monetary claims and her claim to be declared 1/3 owner of HBE. (R. at 
560-75, 1535.) Mr. Hathaway's letter went on to suggest two business appraisers, and, 
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critically, he asked Mr. Morris to "[pjlease contact me at your first opportunity so we can 
more formally set out the procedure toward resolution of the parties' dispute." (R. at 
1535 (emphasis added).) 
The next letter that the Hamiltons presented was Mr. Morris' March 21, 2006 
letter to Mr. Hathaway. (R. at 1529.) In that letter, Mr. Morris clearly indicated that the 
joint appraisal of HBE would be "binding" for any buyout "that would follow from 
judicial determination of Amber's ownership," and he expressed the intention that legal 
obligations between the parties would be deferred until a signed writing was made: 
I am writing to confirm that I need not respond to the Second 
Amended Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint that 
you sent to me on Friday, for the reason that we have reached 
an agreement in principle that most of the claims set forth 
therein are going to be effectively dismissed and released 
when our clients enter into an agreement leaving the share 
of ownership issue as the sole remaining issue to be litigated 
in the case, and agreeing to an evaluation of the company that 
the parties agree will be binding for purposes of any buyouts 
that would follow from judicial determination of Amber's 
ownership. 
(R. at 1529 (emphasis added).) 
The last letter the Hamiltons presented was Mr. Morris' April 17, 2006 letter to 
Mr. Hathaway, enclosing a "proposed" Release and Settlement of Certain Claims, a 
Stipulation and Joint Motion for Order of Partial and Dismissal, and a [Proposed] Order. 
(R. at 1516-27.) The draft Release and Settlement of Certain Claims contained terms that 
were either inconsistent with previously conveyed understandings, or that were 
previously unexpressed: First, it provided that "[njeither the Hamiltons nor McKelvey 
will make payments to each other as a result of this Agreement." (R. at 1525.) Mr. 
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Hathaway had always understood that any settlement would require a buyout of HBE 
shares based on the appraised value of the stock and the judicially determined ownership 
percentages. (R. at 1559.) His understanding was confirmed by Mr. Morris5 March 21, 
2006 letter, in which Mr. Morris indicated that the joint appraisal of HBE "will be 
binding" of any buyout that "would follow from judicial determination of Amber's 
ownership." (R. at 1529 (emphasis added).) 
Second, the draft provided that Amber would dismiss her monetary claims "with 
prejudice." (R. at 1520-21, 1525-26.) Nothing prior thereto indicated there would be any 
dismissal with prejudice, particularly with no buyout or other consideration in exchange. 
When Mr. Hathaway realized that the settlement Mr. Morris was proposing not only 
disclaimed the buyout that Mr. Hathaway understood would follow from a binding 
appraisal of HBE, but also required Amber to dismiss her monetary claims with 
prejudice, he spoke with Mr. Morris and rejected Mr. Morris' proposal, and no further 
communications concerning settlement occurred. (R. at 1560.) 
Further refuting the notion that the parties reached an enforceable settlement on 
February 24, 2006 is all the litigation activity that continued. On February 24, 2006, the 
Hamiltons served responses to Amber's discovery requests; on March 10, 2006, Amber 
served responses to the Hamilton's discovery requests; and on March 17, 2006, Amber 
filed and served her Second Amended Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint. (R. at 
554, 559, 575.) At the very least, this activity indicates that the parties clearly understood 
that there would be no enforceable settlement until there was a signed document 
memorializing it. 
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The actions that the Hamiltons identified in support of the alleged settlement 
agreement consist of: (1) the Hamiltons' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
regarding Amber's percentage of HBE shares and the District Court's April 2007 order 
granting that motion; (2) the joint retention of an appraiser in 2007; and (3) the 
Hamiltons' filing of an answer omitting counterclaims. (R. at 1486-89, 1553.) 
The Hamiltons' motion for partial summary judgment was not part of any alleged 
settlement agreement. None of terms of the alleged settlement agreement included the 
filing of a Rule 56 motion. Rather, the motion was simply a means to determine whether 
res judicata applied, based on the FFCL and the Order in the Gordon Hamilton Matter. 
Although the parties jointly retained a business valuation expert in 2007, it was not 
pursuant to any settlement agreement. (R. at 1486-89.) The joint retention of an 
appraiser grew out of a proposal by Amber's current counsel, Christopher R. Hogle, in 
his first communication to Mr. Morris in the fall of 2006. (R. at 1595.) At that time, Mr. 
Hogle had no knowledge of any alleged settlement agreement. (R. at 1626.) Mr. Hogle 
suggested an appraisal of HBE, not pursuant to an existing settlement agreement, but as 
part of a new approach to resolve the parties' disputes; one that, incidentally, included a 
mandatory buyout of Amber's shares based on the appraised value of the stock. (R. at 
1595.) 
The Hamiltons' purpose in jointly engaging an appraiser for HBE also had nothing 
to do with an alleged settlement agreement. The Hamiltons' counsel committed to 
writing why they had jointly engaged an appraiser, and his letter made no mention of any 
settlement agreement: 
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My understanding has always been that the purpose of this 
appraisal, and the reason both of our clients are paying for it, 
is to simply educate them about how much money they are 
really talking about.. . . 
I think we are both trying to avoid having to go out and retain 
our own experts on this issue.. . . 
(R. at 1605.) Nowhere in his letter identifying the purpose for retaining an appraiser did 
Mr. Morris mention any alleged settlement agreement. Thus, neither side agreed to an 
appraisal of HBE because of any settlement agreement. 
Moreover, before the parties finally engaged an appraiser in March 2007, Amber's 
present counsel made clear in his first District Court appearance that Amber had entered 
into no settlement agreement with the Hamiltons. (R. at 1617-18; see also R. at 1506.) 
Thus, an appraiser was not jointly engaged out of reliance on an alleged settlement 
agreement. 
As for the Hamiltons' omission of counterclaims from their last answer, that also 
is no evidence of any binding settlement agreement. The Hamiltons filed their answer on 
February 22, 2007, almost a year after the "partial settlement agreement" was allegedly 
formed and months after Amber's counsel denied its existence in open court. (R. at 
1375.) Thus, the Hamiltons' counterclaim was not omitted in reliance on any settlement 
agreement. 
#245954 v2 sic 
22 
3. Amber's Evidence And Argument That The Hamiltons 
Fraudulently Procured The FFCL And The Order Is Solely In 
Response To The Hamiltons' Affirmative Defenses To Amber's 
Claim To Be Declared 1/3 Owner Of HBE. 
The first time a claim for a determination of the percentage of each party's HBE 
shares was asserted in this case was on March 20, 2006, when Amber filed her Second 
Amended Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint. (R. at 560-75.) The Fifth Claim 
for Relief in that pleading sought a declaration that Amber's shares of HBE stock equate 
to 1/3 ownership of HBE, and that the Hamiltons collectively have no more than 2/3 of 
the HBE stock. (R. at 565.) 
On November 24, 2006, the Hamiltons moved for partial summary judgment on 
the Fifth Claim for Relief based on affirmative defenses: two statutes of limitations and 
alleged authorization for the receipt of HBE stock contained in the FFCL and the Order 
in the Gordon Hamilton Matter. (R. at 612-14, 615-700.) In her opposition, Amber 
argued that, if the Hamiltons' acquisition of more HBE shares than Amber was 
authorized by an order in the Gordon Hamilton Matter, such order was procured 
fraudulently, which is an established basis for a collateral attack on such order. (R. at 
1102-04 (citing Pepper v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, N.A.. 801 P.2d 144, 148 (Utah 1990)).) 
Amber also argued that the statutes of limitations that the Hamiltons advanced - Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 75-3-1005 and 75-3-1006( 1 )(b)(ii) - provide express exceptions for fraud 
actions. (R. at 1099-1101.) The Hamiltons responded to those arguments on the merits, 
and they did not argue that the absence of such arguments from Amber's complaint 
precluded her from presenting them. (R. at 1287-89, 1302, 1923 pp. 20-24.) 
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Amber did not allege the Hamiltons9 fraud prior to the Hamiltons' Rule 56 motion 
because, prior to that motion, Amber determined that proof of the Hamiltons' fraud was 
not necessary either to obtain the relief she sought or to defend against the Hamiltons' 
counterclaims. (R. at 1879-80.) Prior to Amber's March 17, 2006 Second Amended 
Complaint, the only relief prayed for by the parties was monetary damages on claims and 
counterclaims for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence. (R. at 1-15, 75-88, 162-
67.) In support of her claims or in opposition to the Hamiltons' counterclaim, Amber had 
no need to allege the Hamiltons' fraud, and take on the heightened burden of persuasion 
and additional elements of proof associated with such allegations. (R. at 1879-80.) 
Amber determined that she needed to present evidence of the Hamiltons' fraud only after 
they asserted the FFCL, the Order, and Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-3-1005 and 75-3-1006 as 
affirmative defenses to her claim to be declared a 1/3 owner of HBE. (R. at 1879-80.) 
Another reason that Amber did not raise the Hamiltons' fraudulent procurement of 
the FFCL and the Order before opposing their Rule 56 motion is that the Hamiltons 
swore under oath that they acquired more HBE stock than Amber received, not pursuant 
to the FFCL and the Order, but by causing the Estate to sell HBE stock to them in 
exchange for their $134,540 personal representatives fee and the 1/5 distributions of Lisa 
and Tonua. (R. at 1012-14, 1016, 1052-58.) Thus, the notion that the Hamiltons 
acquired more HBE stock than Amber through the FFCL and the Order was belied by the 
Hamiltons' own testimony. 
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On February 23, 2007, the Hamiltons filed an Answer to Second Amended 
Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint. (R. at 1367-75.) The Hamiltons' February 
2007 answer was their first pleading to assert affirmative defenses based on the FFCL, 
the Order, and Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-3-1005 and 75-3-1006 to Amber's claim to be 
declared a 1/3 owner of HBE. (R. at 1368-69.) 
The District Court's rulings on the Rule 56 motion left open the issue of whether 
the Hamiltons fraudulently procured the FFCL and Order. (R. at 1384.) On March 27, 
2007, the Court entered a Ruling on the Rule 56 motion, which provided that 
"McKelvey's claims of fraud, misrepresentation, and inadequate disclosure are not barred 
by Sections 75-3-1005 and 75-3-1006." (R. at 1384.) On April 16, 2007, the District 
Court entered an Order Granting Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, which also left 
open the issue of whether the FFCL and Order were fraudulently procured, as well as the 
"issues of whether any transfers of shares to the Hamiltons violated the bylaws of 
[HBE]." (R. at 1392.) 
On April 13, 2007, Mr. Hogle sent Mr. Morris an e-mail, raising the issue of 
whether Amber needed to incorporate her fraudulent procurement argument into her 
pleadings to preserve it. (R. at 1719, 1722.) Specifically, Mr. Hogle wrote: 
I'm wondering if you and I can agree on a matter regarding 
the pleadings, which is whether I need to do anything more to 
preserve the grounds I asserted in opposition to the defenses 
on which defendants predicated their Rule 56 motion. 
Defendants' Rule 56 motion was based on defenses, namely, 
statutes of limitation and Judge Burningham's findings, 
conclusions, and order. I set forth plaintiffs response to 
those defenses in my memorandum in opposition and during 
oral argument. After oral argument, defendants filed their 
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answer to the current complaint, pleading those defenses for 
the first time. I've researched the matter, and based on what 
I've found, I don't think I have to file a reply to your Answer 
to the Second Amended Complaint in order to preserve the 
grounds I asserted in opposition to defendants' Rule 56 
motion. 
I'd like to discuss the matter with you to try to get your 
agreement that I don't have to file a reply to your answer. 
Otherwise, I'll have to file a motion with the Court, asking 
permission to basically turn my opposition to Rule 56 motion 
into a reply to the answer. Please give me a call when you get 
a chance. 
(R. at 1719.) In his same-day reply, Mr. Morris wrote: "Got your voicemail and this. I 
think you're right. Let's talk monday." (R. at 1719 (emphasis added).) 
On April 17, 2007, Mr. Morris agreed that Amber was not required to file a reply 
to the Hamiltons' answer to preserve Amber's response to the Hamiltons' affirmative 
defenses, even though such response consists, in part, of averments of fraud. (R. at 
1722.) Immediately thereafter, Mr. Hogle sent a letter to Mr. Morris confirming Mr. 
Morris' agreement. (R. at 1717, 1722.) In part, the April 17 letter provides: 
Specifically, we talked about whether plaintiff should file a 
reply to the affirmative defenses raised for the first time in 
defendants' February 22, 2007 answer in order to preserve the 
response to those defenses that plaintiff expressed in 
opposition to defendants' Rule 56 motion. You agreed that 
plaintiff is not required to file a reply to preserve those 
grounds, even though those grounds consist, in part, of 
averments of fraud. Accordingly, I will not endeavor to file a 
reply to the new affirmative defenses. 
(R. at 1717.) The Hamiltons' counsel never objected or disagreed with the contents of 
the April 17, 2007 letter until October 15, 2007. (R. at 1722.) 
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During the October 15, 2007 hearing on the Hamiltons' Motion to Enforce Partial 
Settlement Agreement, the Hamiltons' counsel, for the first time, argued that Amber 
should be precluded from presenting evidence and argument of the Hamiltons' fraud 
because Amber's complaint makes no mention of it. (R. at 1924 pp. 41-42.) A few days 
later, Amber filed her Motion in Limine Regarding Evidence and Argument Responsive 
to Defendants' Affirmative Defenses, and, If Necessary, Motion for Order to File Reply 
to Answer, seeking an order allowing her to present her fraudulent procurement theory. 
(R. at 1695-99.) 
The Hamiltons opposed Amber's motion, arguing that it "[wa]s merely an attempt 
to add, by amendment, affirmative claims and causes of action." (R. at 1849-50.) To 
persuade the District Court that Amber's fraudulent procurement argument sought no 
relief but went only to rebut the Hamilton's affirmative defenses, Amber offered to 
stipulate to a limiting jury instruction that her evidence and argument of the Hamiltons' 
fraud bears solely upon the Hamiltons' defenses to Amber's claim to be declared a 1/3 
owner of HBE and the Hamiltons' credibility, and that Amber is to be awarded no 
affirmative relief on her fraud evidence. (R. at 1877-78.) Nevertheless, the District 
Court denied Amber's motion. (R. at 1905.) The District Court reasoned that granting it 
"would result in allowing Plaintiff to amend her pleading to bring a new affirmative 
cause of action to set aside the Order and Findings and Conclusions," which Amber 
would not need to set aside had the Hamiltons not raised them as affirmative defenses to 
Amber's claim to be declared a 1/3 owner of HBE. (R. at 1905.) 
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VIII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. 
The District Court erred when it held, as a matter of law, that the FFCL and Order 
authorized the Hamiltons to each receive 4,158.5 shares of HBE stock. In so holding, the 
District Court focused on portions of the FFCL indicating that the Estate held 10,000 
shares of HBE stock (before the Estate's liabilities were deducted), and the portion of the 
FFCL distributing to the Hamiltons "[a]ll other property of the Estate." Assuming that 
the language on which the District Court focused authorized the Hamiltons to take 8,317 
shares of HBE stock, that language conflicts with the FFCL's per share price, accounting 
of the Estate's assets and expenses, and distributions to the three sisters, which renders 
the FFCL and the Order ambiguous. Ambiguity in court orders is construed against the 
parties who prepared it, who in this case are the Hamiltons. Culbertson v. Board of 
County Comm'rs, 2001 UT 108, If 15, 44 P.3d 642. 
The District Court further erred when it found, as a matter of law, that the parties 
had entered into a partial settlement agreement and, on that basis, dismissed with 
prejudice Amber's monetary claims. The Hamiltons failed to present admissible 
evidence to prove that the parties entered into such an agreement. At the very least, the 
evidence before the District Court created a fact issue on whether the parties entered into 
a settlement agreement. The correspondence that the Hamiltons presented indicated that 
the essential terms changed over time, and Amber presented affidavit testimony 
categorically denying that the parties entered into the settlement agreement advanced by 
the Hamiltons. Alternatively, the evidence, including correspondence and continued 
litigation activity after the alleged formation of the alleged partial settlement agreement, 
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created an inference that the legal obligations arising from any settlement agreement were 
intended to await a signed written contract, which never existed. 
The District Court also erred when it denied Amber's Motion in Limine Regarding 
Evidence and Argument Responsive to Defendants' Affirmative Defenses, and, If 
Necessary, Motion for Order to File Reply to Answer, in which Amber sought an order 
allowing her to present her evidence and argument that the Hamiltons fraudulently 
procured from Judge Burningham the alleged authorization to take the shares of HBE 
stock they claim. The District Court held that Amber was precluded from presenting her 
fraudulent procurement theory because it was absent from her complaint. Plaintiffs, 
however, are not precluded from asserting responses to defendants' affirmative defenses, 
even if such responses are absent from the plaintiffs' complaints. Hansen v. Morris, 283 
P.2d 884, 886 (Utah 1955); see also FDIC v. First Nat'l Finance Co., 587 F.2d 1009, 
1012 (9th Cir. 1978) (same). Amber's fraudulent procurement theory was advanced 
solely in response to the Hamiltons' affirmative defenses to Amber's claim to be declared 
a 1/3 owner of HBE. But for those defenses, Amber would have no need to present her 
fraudulent procurement theory. 
Finally, the District Court erred in denying Amber permission to file a reply to the 
Hamiltons' affirmative defenses to Amber's claim to be declared a 1/3 owner of HBE. 
The District Court denied such permission on the grounds that Amber's proposed reply 
would be untimely and unduly prejudicial. It would be neither. The substance of 
Amber's proposed reply had been litigated for months with the Hamiltons' implied and 
express consent before Amber sought to file her reply. Furthermore, all the discovery 
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conducted on the parties' claims also is relevant to Amber's fraud theory, and, in any 
event, the facts surrounding such theory are all within the Hamiltons' control. 
IX. ARGUMENT. 
A. NEITHER THE FFCL NOR THE ORDER AUTHORIZED THE 
HAMILTONS TO TAKE MORE HBE STOCK THAN AMBER 
RECEIVED. 
Court orders, findings and conclusions are interpreted to be reasonable, effective, 
and in harmony with the facts; and ambiguities are construed against their drafters: 
Specifically, we look to the language of the order, and we 
"'[may] resort . . . to the pleadings and findings. Where 
construction is called for, it is the duty of the court to interpret 
an ambiguity [in a manner that makes] the judgment more 
reasonable, effective, conclusive, and [that} brings the 
judgment into harmony with the facts and the law.'" In 
addition, we construe any ambiguities in the order against 
the prevailing parties who drafted it, which in this case 
are the defendants. 
Culbertson v. Board of County Comm'rs, 2001 UT 108, U 15, 44 P.3d 642 (emphasis 
added) (alterations in original) (quoting Park City Utah Corp. v. Ensign Co.t586 P.2d 
446, 450 (Utah 1978) (quoting Moon Lake Water Users Assoc, v. Hanson, 535 P.2d 
1262, 1264 (Utah 1975))). 
In this case, neither the FFCL nor the Order authorized the Hamiltons to take more 
HBE stock than Amber. At the very least, the FFCL and the Order are ambiguous, and 
the ambiguity created in the Order and the FFCL by the Hamiltons should be construed 
against them. Id 
The District Court relied on three portions of the FFCL to conclude that the 
Hamiltons were entitled to all the HBE stock not issued to Amber. First, it divided the 
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$841,000 value of the "Hamilton Brothers Electric Stock" by the FFCL's per share price, 
$84.10/share, to conclude that there were 10,000 outstanding shares of HBE stock. (R. at 
1383.) Next, the District Court relied on the portion of the Order indicating that c"[a]ll 
other property of the Estate . . . is to be awarded to [the Hamiltons].'" (R. at 1381 
(alteration in original) (quoting R. at 863).) Because the FFCL and the Order specifically 
dealt with only 1,683 shares of HBE stock, the District Court concluded that "[a]ll other 
property of the Estate" included the other 8,317 shares. (R. at 1391.) 
That conclusion is at odds with other portions of the FFCL and the Order, 
specifically the provisions indicating "[a]ll other property of the Estate" available after 
deductions for expenses and distributions to the sisters could not possibly equal 8,317 
shares and the provisions that very clearly indicate that the Hamiltons together were, at 
most, entitled to receive 2/5 of the net value of the Estate. The fundamental starting of 
the FFCL and the Order was that each of Gordon Hamilton's five heirs were to receive 
"equal" distributions. (R. at 882 U 5(b), 8691fl| 41-42.) In fact, the FFCL indicates that 
the Hamiltons, as personal representatives, were expressly charged to ensure that the 
shares were equal: "Gordon Dean Hamilton specifically provided in his Will that. . . 
[tjhe Personal Representatives shall make the shares equal." (R. at 882 % 
5(b)(emphasis added).) Because there were five heirs, equality meant that each heir 
could receive only 1/5 of the net value of the Estate. 
The FFCL indicates that 1/5 of the net value of the Estate equaled "the sum of 
$178,333 for each heir." (R. at 869 ^ 41.) The FFCL further indicates that $53,492 in 
distributions of Estate insurance proceeds, household goods in kind, and cash "have 
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previously been received by each of the heirs." (R. at 869-70, 1302.) Accordingly, the 
net value available for each heir was $124,841 ($178,333 - $53,492 = $124,841). 
According to the FFCL, however, there was simply not enough assets in the Estate 
for the Hamiltons to each receive a $124,841 share. Instead of $178,333, the FFCL 
increased each of the three sister's total distribution to $195,000, which meant less assets 
available for the Hamiltons. (R. at 867-69, 1302.) Consequently, assuming the accuracy 
of the FFCL's accounting of the Estate's assets and liabilities, and deducting the $53,492 
of Estate assets they each had already received, "[a]ll other property of the Estate" 
available for the Hamiltons would equal only $199,680 for both, or $99,840 apiece.7 (R. 
at 1302.) 
In fact, the Hamiltons themselves presented this calculation to Judge Burningham 
in response to an objection to their proposed FFCL and Order. In that filing, the 
Hamiltons represented that the FFCL and the Order authorized each of them to receive 
only $99,840: 
Finding no. 41 [of the FFCL] provides that the net Estate 
available for distribution is $891,665 The $891,665 is to 
be further reduced by the prior distributions to each of the 
five heirs of $53,492 or $267,460 (see finding no. 42). That 
leaves a net Estate of $624,205 to be distributed, as illustrated 
below: 
7
 Even though Amber's counsel pointed this out both in Amber's memorandum in 
opposition to the Hamiltons' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and during oral 
argument (R. at 1111-13, 1120, 1129-30, 1140, 1923, pp. 33-34, 37), the District Court 
inexplicably indicated that "[i]t is undisputed that. . . Stuart Hamilton, and Vincent 
Hamilton each received 1,683 shares of HBE stock as their initial distribution from the 
Estate." (R. at 1380.) At no time did Amber concede that Stuart and Vincent received 
1,683 shares as their initial distribution from the Estate. 
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Total distribution Estate $891,665 
Less prior distributions 267,460 
Estate left to be distributed $624,205 
1/5 to each heir is: $124,841 
The Order of the Court is: 
Amber McKelvey (stock) $141,508 
Lisa H. Kunz (cash and deferred pmt.) $ 141,508 
Tonua Hamilton (cash and deferred pmt.) $ 141,508 
Stuart G. Hamilton (net after all debts) $ 99,840 
Vincent C. Hamilton (net after all debts) $ 99,840 
The Personal Representatives have very generously offered 
the three sisters a bonus not shared by the Personal 
Representatives in actual value plus assuming all of the risks 
of the sale of the real property and the shortfall of expenses, if 
any, of the taxes and attorney fees beyond the reserves. 
(R. at 918 (emphasis added).) The Hamiltons in this case admitted that each of them 
could receive only $99,840 in assets from the Estate. (R. at 1302.) 
Even assuming that the Hamiltons had not "very generously" sacrificed a portion 
of their distributions and were each entitled to a $141,508 distribution, the most HBE 
stock that could be acquired with $141,508 was 1,683 shares. This is conclusively 
established by the fact that Amber opted to take every penny of her $141,508 distribution 
in HBE stock, and $141,508 equated to 1,683 shares. (R. at 868.) Thus, a full $141,508 
distribution received entirely in the form of HBE stock equated to no more than 1,683 
shares of HBE stock. 
Unlike Amber, however, the Hamiltons did not take their distributions entirely in 
the form of HBE stock. Both testified that they took for themselves one of the real 
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properties of the Estate - the "Commercial Lot on South Main" valued at $85,000. (R. at 
866-67, 870, 971, 998-99, 1010, 1050-51.) Furthermore, the Hamiltons did not receive 
$141,508 distributions from the Estate; instead they only received $99,840 distributions. 
(R. at 1302.) Thus, the most HBE shares they could possibly have received was 682 
shares ($99,840 - ($85,000 - 2) = $57,340 - $84.10/share = 682 shares).8 
Accordingly, as the Hamiltons themselves demonstrated to Judge Burningham, it 
was mathematically impossible for "[a] 11 other property of the Estate" available for the 
Hamiltons to include 8,317 shares, or $699,460, in HBE stock, plus the $85,000 
commercial lot that the Hamiltons kept for themselves. The total of such assets— 
$784,460—is staggeringly larger than 2/5 of the net Estate available for distribution to 
the heirs, to which the Hamiltons were limited by the FFCL. The only way "[a]ll other 
property of the Estate" could include 8,317 shares of HBE stock is if the FFCL's 
$84.10/share price, the FFCL's accounting of Estate assets and liabilities, and the FFCL 
and Order's distributions to the three sisters are disregarded. The Hamiltons could 
receive 8,317 shares, but only if the stock was worth much less than the FFCL's 
$84.10/share price. The Hamiltons could receive $699,460 in stock, but only if: (1) the 
FFCL understated the Estate's assets; (2) the FFCL overstated the Estate's expenses; or 
(3) the FFCL and the Order made no distributions to Amber, Lisa and Tonua, but instead 
awarded the entire net Estate to the Hamiltons. Because the FFCL's per share price, 
8
 If the Hamiltons could have exchanged their $134,540 personal representatives 
fee for stock, notwithstanding the stock transfer restrictions in HBE's Bylaws, the 
Hamiltons could each receive 800 more shares ($134,540 - 2 -$84.10/share = 800 
shares), for a total of 1,482 shares apiece. 
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accounting of Estate assets and expenses, and distributions to the sisters may not be 
disregarded, the FFCL and the Order simply cannot be construed to have authorized the 
Hamiltons to each take more HBE stock than Amber received.9 
Thus, "[a]ll other property of the Estate" could not have possibly included 8,317 
shares of HBE stock. As the Hamiltons themselves demonstrated to Judge Burningham 
and the District Court in this case, "[a]ll other property of the Estate" amounted to only 
$199,680. (R. at 918, 1302.) If the "[a]ll other property of the Estate" provision could 
somehow be construed to include 8,317 shares of stock, it would conflict with other 
provisions of the FFCL and the Order, including the FFCL's uequal[ity]" requirements, 
per share price of HBE stock, the FFCL's accounting of the Estate's assets and liabilities, 
and the FFCL and the Order's distributions to the three sisters. Such conflict creates an 
9
 At one point, the District Court asked, if the Hamiltons could not receive all of 
the shares unallocated to Amber, what happened to them? (R. at 1923, p. 40.) Unless the 
FFCL's per share price, accounting, and distributions to the sisters are disregarded, the 
answer is that the value represented by those shares had to go to satisfy Estate expenses. 
As the Hamiltons demonstrated to Judge Burningham, only $341,188 in Estate assets 
were available for Amber, Stuart and Vincent ($141,508 + $99,840 + $99,840 = 
$341,188) after deductions for Estate expenses, the $267,460 in assets already distributed 
to the heirs, and the cash and deferred cash distributions for Lisa and Tonua. (R. at 918, 
1302.) Before identifying the Estate's expenses and these distributions, the FFCL 
provided that HBE was worth $841,000, an amount much larger than the $341,188 value 
of Estate assets available for Amber and the Hamiltons. Accordingly, some of HBE's 
value had to be used to satisfy Estate liabilities; otherwise, there would have been more 
than $341,188 in assets available for Amber and the Hamiltons. Indeed, the Hamiltons 
presented proof of HBE's redemption of shares in exchange for HBE's payment of Estate 
taxes and funeral and administrative expenses. (R. at 1217.) So, unless the FFCL's share 
price, accounting, and distributions to the sisters are disregarded, the inescapable 
conclusion is that HBE effectively redeemed the shares that the Estate could not afford to 
pass on to Amber, Stuart and Vincent in exchange for HBE's satisfaction of Estate 
liabilities. 
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ambiguity, and the Utah Supreme Court has directed what happens with ambiguous court 
orders: "we construe any ambiguities in the order against the prevailing parties who 
drafted it, which in this case are the defendants." Culbertson v. Board of County 
Comm'rs, 2001 UT 108,U 15, 44 P.3d 642. Because the District Court erred in its 
construction of the FFCL and the Order, its summary judgment in the Hamiltons5 favor 
should be revered. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE EXISTENCE 
OF A PARTIAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND, ON THAT 
BASIS, DISMISSING WITH PREJUDICE AMBER'S MONETARY 
CLAIMS. 
1. The Hamiltons Failed To Satisfy Their Burden Of Proving The 
Alleged Partial Settlement Agreement. 
"[T]he burden of proof for showing the parties' mutual assent as to all material 
terms and conditions is on the party claiming that there is a contract." Cal Wadsworth 
Constr. v. City of St. George, 898 P.2d 1372, 1376 (Utah 1995). In this case, the 
Hamiltons are the ones who claimed a "partial settlement agreement," so they had the 
burden of proof. To satisfy their burden, the Hamiltons were required to present evidence 
that was admissible under the Utah Rules of Evidence. Utah R. Evid. 101,1101(a). 
The Hamiltons presented no admissible evidence that Amber assented to all 
material terms and conditions of the alleged partial settlement agreement. "An 
acceptance must unconditionally assent to all material terms presented in the offer...." 
Cal Wadsworth Constr., 898 P.2d at 1376. The Hamiltons presented no signed settlement 
agreement and no statement attributable to Amber assenting to the terms of their alleged 
partial settlement agreement. 
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The only statement attributable to Amber that the Hamiltons presented is the 
March 1, 2006 letter from Mr. Hathaway "following up on our conversation regarding an 
approach toward resolving the two pieces of the pending litigation," the "two pieces" 
being Amber's monetary claims and her claim for a declaration as to the parties' 
respective percentages of HBE ownership. (R. at 1535.) Nothing in Mr. Hathaway's 
letter expresses "unconditional[ ] assent to all material terms presented in" the alleged 
partial settlement agreement. Cal Wadsworth Constr., 898 P.2d at 1376. One such term 
was the late-blooming provision that a buyout of shares would not follow from the joint 
appraisal of HBE and the judicial determination of Amber's ownership percentage, which 
was inconsistent with both Mr. Hathaway's understanding all along and Mr. Morris' 
March 21, 2006 letter. During oral argument, the District Court characterized the buyout 
disclaimer as "a very material term that there wasn't a meeting of the minds about." (R. 
at 1924, p. 12.) Another term required Amber to dismiss "with prejudice" her monetary 
claims, which, as Mr. Hathaway testified, was never agreed to. (R. at 1559-60.) 
Instead of any statements attributable to Amber, the Hamiltons relied on unsworn, 
out-of-court statements of their own attorney - primarily his February 24, 2006 letter. 
(R. at 1536-37.) Such letter, along with others authored by the Hamiltons' attorney, is 
inadmissible hearsay when offered by the Hamiltons. Utah R. Evid. 801, 802. By choice 
or by inability, the Hamiltons did not present a statement by a declarant while testifying 
under oath to support the existence of their alleged partial settlement agreement. 
In sum, although the Utah Rules of Evidence applied to the determination of 
whether the parties entered into a settlement agreement, the Hamiltons presented no 
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admissible evidence proving that Amber assented to the "partial settlement agreement." 
Accordingly, the District Court's finding of a partial settlement agreement should be 
reversed. 
2. The Hathaway Affidavit Gave Rise To A Material Fact Dispute 
As To Whether Amber Assented To The Alleged "Partial 
Settlement Agreement." 
Whether the parties entered into a binding contract is a question of fact: 
It is the rule "that where the existence of a contract is the 
point in issue and the evidence is conflicting or admits of 
more than one inference, it is for the jury to determine 
whether the contract did in fact exist." In Thornton v. Pasch, 
[104 Utah 313, 139 P.2d 1002 (1943),] this court held that 
whether a party accepted an offer so as to form a binding 
contract was for the jury to decide. And in Brown v. Board of 
Education of Morgan County School District, [560 P.2d 1129 
(Utah 1977),] we held that "while it is for the court to 
interpret and assess the meaning of a contract, issues of fact 
are properly submitted to a jury." Whether the parties 
intended to enter a binding contract is such an issue of fact. 
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin formulated it thus: "There 
is no meeting of the minds where the parties do not intend to 
contract and the question of intent generally is one to be 
determined by the trier of fact." Household Utilities v. The 
Andreiss Co.[, 236 N.W.2d 663 (Wis. 1976).] 
O'Hara v. Hall 628 P.2d 1289, 1291 (Utah 1981) (footnotes omitted) (holding that the 
trial court's ruling, as a matter of law, that a contract had been formed was reversible 
error because there was evidence from which a jury could infer that the parties did not 
intend to enter into a binding contract). 
Amber presented evidence that she did not intend to enter into the alleged "partial 
settlement agreement." The Hamiltons claimed that their attorney negotiated a settlement 
agreement with Amber's attorney, Mr. Hathaway, but Mr. Hathaway's affidavit refutes 
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that claim. (R. at 1559-60.) Mr. Hathaway testified that he never assented to any 
settlement agreement that would require the dismissal with prejudice of Amber's claims 
for monetary relief, particularly when there was no commitment for a buyout of shares 
based on the HBE appraisal and a judicial determination of ownership percentages. (R. at 
1559-60.) By disregarding the Hathaway affidavit, the District Court erred, and its 
decision should be reversed. 
3. The Correspondence Upon Which The Hamiltons Relied, And 
The Continued Litigation Activity After The Alleged Formation 
Of The Partial Settlement Agreement, Indicates That The 
Parties Intended There To Be No Binding Agreement Until A 
Formal Writing Was Executed. 
'"If an intention is manifested in any way that legal obligations between the 
parties shall be deferred until the writing is made, the preliminary negotiations and 
agreements do not constitute a contract.5" 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Weigner, 2005 UT 
App. 523 U 7, 127 P.3d 1241, 1243 (quoting R. J. Daum Constr. Co. v. Child, 122 Utah 
194, 247 P.2d 817, 820 (1952)); see also Engineering Assocs., Inc. v. Irving Place 
Assocs., Inc., 622 P.2d 784, 787 (Utah 1980) ("There does not appear to be any doubt 
that if the parties make it clear that they do not intend that there should be legal 
consequences unless and until a formal writing is executed, there is no contract until that 
time."). 
In this case, if the parties did reach an agreement, they clearly intended for it to 
take effect only after a writing was agreed upon and signed. That intention is reflected in 
the correspondence on which the Hamiltons relied and the litigation activity that 
continued after the settlement agreement was allegedly formed in February, 2006. 
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The correspondence reflects such an intention. Mr. Morris' February 24, 2006 
letter inquires whether Mr. Hathaway contemplated a writing to memorialize an 
agreement. (R. at 1537.) Mr. Hathaway's March 1, 2006 letter asked Mr. Morris to 
contact Mr. Hathaway "so we can more formally set out the procedure toward resolution 
of the parties5 dispute." (R. at 1535.) Mr. Morris' March 21, 2006 letter indicates that 
claims are going to be dismissed "when our clients enter into an agreement leaving the 
share of ownership as the sole remaining issue to be litigated in the case, and agreeing to 
an evaluation of the company." (R. at 1529.) Indeed, the Hamiltons' counsel admitted 
that the March 21 letter "can be read to say we don't have a deal until we've signed a 
writing." (R. at 1924 p. 19.) After March 21, 2006, the Hamiltons' counsel went to the 
trouble of preparing a "proposed" settlement agreement, which was enclosed with Mr. 
Morris' April 17, 2006 letter. (R. at 1516-27.) 
In addition, litigation activity continued after the Hamiltons allegedly accepted 
Mr. Hathaway's purported settlement offer on or before February 24, 2006. The parties 
answered discovery requests, and Amber filed and served her Second Amended 
Complaint. (R. at 554, 559, 575.) Had an enforceable settlement agreement been formed 
on February 24, 2006, as the Hamiltons argued and the District Court found, none of this 
activity would have occurred. Such activity, as well as the correspondence presented by 
the Hamiltons, provides evidence upon which a trier of fact could conclude that "'an 
intention [was] manifested . . . that legal obligations between the parties shall be deferred 
until [a] writing is made.'" 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 2005 UT App. 523 H 7, 127 P.3d at 
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1243. The District Court did not appreciate the significance of such evidence, so its 
decision should be reversed. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN PRECLUDING AMBER FROM 
PRESENTING HER FRAUDULENT PROCUREMENT EVIDENCE 
AND ARGUMENT. 
Because it was absent from her complaint, the District Court precluded Amber 
from presenting evidence and argument that the Hamiltons fraudulently procured the 
alleged authorization in the FFCL and the Order to take the HBE stock they claim. (R. at 
1905.) Amber, however, was not required to incorporate her fraudulent procurement 
theory into her complaint because the theory was offered solely to rebut affirmative 
defenses to Amber's claim to be declared a 1/3 owner of HBE, which the Hamiltons 
raised for the first time in their November 22, 2006 Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment and, later, in their February 22, 2007 Answer to Second Amended Verified 
Shareholder Derivative Complaint. (R. at 613-14, 1368-69.) A plaintiff is not precluded 
from asserting responses to the defendants' affirmative defenses, even though such 
responses do not appear in plaintiffs pleadings. Hansen v. Morris, 283 P.2d 884, 886 
(Utah 1955); see also FDIC v. First Naf 1 Finance Co., 587 F.2d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 
1978) (same). 
Hansen v. Morris was a quiet title action commenced by the plaintiffs to judicially 
confirm their title to property, which they acquired after a tax sale. The defendants were 
the previous owners who lost the property for failing to pay property taxes. The 
defendants challenged the tax sale, and plaintiffs responded to that defense with the 
statute of limitations on tax sale challenges, which, like averments of fraud, must 
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generally be pled affirmatively and with specificity. Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c), 9(h). The 
plaintiffs prevailed in the District Court, and the defendants appealed, arguing that 
plaintiffs waived the statute of limitations by not pleading it. 
The Utah Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs were not required to plead the 
statute of limitations because the statute was asserted in response to defendants' defenses: 
We concede that statutes of limitation generally must be 
pleaded. Such principle usually applies to defendants only. 
In our instant case we have the unique situation where such a 
statute must be pleaded by the plaintiff. Under Rule 8(c) 
statutes of limitation must be pleaded and at first blush it 
would appear that plaintiff is bound by such rule. However, 
an anomaly is presented where, as here, plaintiff must assert 
the statute, since the only pleading available to him would be 
a reply, a pleading unauthorized under Rule 7(a) as a matter 
of right, except in attacking a counterclaim, and which can 
only be filed by order of the court. Hence, it is obvious that 
Rule 8(c), in logic and good sense cannot hold a plaintiff 
seeking to assert a statute to knock out a defense, to the 
same strict accountability that it can a defendant seeking 
to knock out a claim. 
Id. at 886 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). This reasoning is consistent with the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which demand that "[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed 
as to do substantial justice," and require that the rules "be liberally construed to secure 
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." Utah R. Civ. P. 1(a), 
8(f).10 
10
 See also Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 211, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (1963) ("[The 
rules] must all be looked to in the light of their even more fundamental purpose of 
liberalizing both pleading and procedure to the end that the parties are afforded the 
privilege of presenting whatever legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their 
dispute. What they are entitled to is notice of the issues raised and an opportunity to meet 
them. When this is accomplished, that is all that is required. Our rules provide for 
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The District Court should have likewise concluded that Amber satisfied the 
pleading rules. Amber's fraud allegations were asserted "to knock o u t . . . defense[s]" 
specifically the Hamiltons' defenses of authorization based on the FFCL and the Order 
and statute of limitations defenses. Fraudulent procurement of judicial authorization is an 
established ground to negate such authorization. Pepper v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, N.A,, 
801 P.2d 144, 148-49 (Utah 1990). And the statutes of limitations on which the 
Hamiltons relied provide express exceptions for cases involving fraud or inadequate 
disclosure. Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-3-1005, 75-3-1006(2). 
Instead, the District Court concluded that allowing Amber to present her fraud 
theory "would result in allowing Plaintiff to amend her pleading to bring a new 
affirmative cause of action to set aside the Order and Findings and Conclusions." (R. at 
1905.) Clearly, the District Court misperceived the parties' respective burdens on 
Amber's claim to be declared 1/3 owner of HBE. Amber did not have the burden of 
setting aside the FFCL and the Order. To establish a prima facie case, all Amber had to 
prove was that the Hamiltons obtained shares for themselves in one or more transactions 
in which they acted in a fiduciary capacity. Wheeler v. Mann, 763 P.2d 758, 760 (Utah 
1988) ("[A]ny transaction involving self-dealing by a trustee is not only prima facie 
invalid, but is voidable by the beneficiaries, regardless of any loss suffered by the trust 
Estate, the payment of valuable consideration, or the existence of good faith."). The 
liberality to allow examination into and settlement of all issues bearing upon the 
controversy, but safeguard the rights of the other party to have a reasonable time to meet 
a new issue if he so requests."). 
#245954 v2 sic 
43 
Hamiltons' receipt of HBE shares after Amber received her shares is sufficient, in and of 
itself, to make out a prima facie case of self-dealing, as the Hamiltons then occupied 
fiduciary positions both as personal representatives of the Estate and directors and 
officers of HBE. Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-3-711 (personal representatives are answerable 
to heirs "to the same extent as a trustee of an express trust"); Bingham Constr. Co. v. 
Groesbeck, 2004 UT App 434, If 22, 105 P.3d 365 ('"Directors and officers have a 
fiduciary duty of loyalty to their corporation and its stockholders....'" (quoting 
Nicholson v. Evans, 642 P.2d 727, 730 (Utah 1982)). 
Instead of Amber bearing the burden of proving the illegitimacy of the Hamiltons' 
receipt of HBE stock, it the Hamiltons who had the burden of justifying their acquisition 
of HBE shares.11 Indeed, the Hamiltons understood that they had the burden of proving 
authorization for their receipt of HBE stock, which is why they alleged authorization as 
an affirmative defense. (R. at 1368-69.) The District Court, however, believed that 
Amber had the burden of proof, and it revealed its belief by characterizing Amber's fraud 
11
 Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-712 ("Any sale or encumbrance to the personal 
representative . . . or any transaction which is affected by a substantial conflict of interest 
on the part of the personal representative, is voidable by any person interested in the 
Estate, except one who has consented after fair disclosure, unless: (1) The will or a 
contract entered into by the decedent expressly authorized the transaction; or (2) The 
transaction is approved by the court after notice to interested persons."); Peterson v. 
Budge, 35 Utah 596, 609, 102 P. 211, 215-16 ("There is no rule of law more firmly 
established than that which holds that transactions between persons occupying fiduciary 
or confidential relations with each other, in which the stronger or superior party obtains 
an advantage over the other, cannot be upheld. . . . And the rule is well settled that in 
actions of this kind, where these confidential relations are shown to exist the burden of 
proof is cast upon the superior party to establish the perfect fairness, adequacy of 
consideration, and equity of the transaction."). 
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theory as an "affirmative cause of action to set aside the Order and Findings and 
Conclusions." (R. at 1905.) Because the District Court erred, its decision should be 
reversed. 
D. IF NECESSARY, THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE 
DISTRICT COURT'S DENIAL OF LEAVE TO FILE A REPLY TO 
THE HAMILTONS' ANSWER. 
Rule 7(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows for "a reply to an answer" if 
ordered by the Court. If this Court determines that Amber's pleadings must incorporate 
assertions offered "to knock out a defense" this Court should reverse the District 
Court's denial of leave for Amber's proposed reply, which was attached to her motion in 
limine. (R. at 1674-94.) 
The District Court denied Amber permission to file her proposed reply on the 
grounds that "any additional amendments on these issues would be untimely and unduly 
prejudicial." (R. at 1905.) Amber's reply, however, would be neither untimely nor 
unduly prejudicial. Amber's reply consisted entirely of evidence and argument presented 
in her memorandum in opposition to the Hamilton's motion for partial summary 
judgment. (R. at 1097-1160, 1674-94.) The Hamiltons responded to such evidence and 
argument on the merits and did not object on the grounds that they were absent from 
Amber's complaint. (R. at 1287-89, 1302, 1923 pp. 20-24.) In addition, the Hamiltons' 
counsel clearly agreed that Amber did not need to add to her pleadings in order to 
Hansen, 283 P.2d at 886. 
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preserve the grounds asserted in response to the Hamiltons' Rule 56 motion. (R. at 1717, 
1719, 1722.) 
In Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Way Marketing, Ltd., 753 P.2d 507, 511 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988), this Court held that the trial court abused its discretion by denying leave 
to plaintiff for an amendment to include a contract reformation claim that had been tried 
with the defendant's implicit consent in response to an issue raised by the defendant for 
the first time at trial. Likewise, in this case, the District Court denied Amber permission 
to incorporate into her pleadings evidence and argument that had been litigated with the 
Hamilton's implicit and express consent and that were presented only to respond to the 
Hamiltons' newly asserted affirmative defenses to Amber's claim to be declared a 1/3 
owner of HBE. Following Lloyd's Unlimited, this Court should reverse the District 
Court's denial of permission for Amber's reply. 
In addition, the District Court could identify no unfair prejudice to the Hamiltons 
arising from Amber's proposed reply. The contents of the reply had been part of the case 
for months without any objection from the Hamiltons. Furthermore, the discovery 
conducted on the parties' claims also is relevant to Amber's fraud theory, and, in any 
event, the facts surrounding such theory are all within the Hamiltons' control. 
Accordingly, Amber's proposed reply was neither untimely nor unduly prejudicial. 
Therefore, if this Court concludes that a reply to the Hamiltons' affirmative defenses is 
necessary to preserve Amber's fraudulent procurement theory, the Court should reverse 
the District Court's decision and remand with instructions to allow Amber to file her 
proposed reply. 
46 
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X. CONCLUSION, 
For at least these reasons, Amber respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
District Court's partial summary judgment in the Hamiltons' favor and the District 
Court's order establishing and enforcing an alleged partial settlement agreement. In 
addition, this Court should reverse the District Court's order precluding Amber from 
presenting her fraudulent procurement theory due to its absence from her pleadings or, in 
the alternative, reverse the District Court's denial of Amber's motion to file a reply to the 
Hamiltons' answer and remand with instructions to allow Amber to file her reply. 
Finally, this Court should remand this case to the District Court for a trial on the merits of 
Amber's claims against the Hamiltons. 
DATED this 19th day of September, 2008. 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP 
(k^ e &*\,— 
Christopher R. Hogjle) 
Richard D. Flint 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this 19th day of September, 2008, two true 
and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT was served by U.S. mail, 
postage prepaid, as follows: 
Mark O. Morris 
Stewart O. Peay 
SNELL & WILMER L.L.P. 
15 W. South Temple, Suite 1200 
Gateway Tower West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 -1004 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Counterclaimants, Stuart G. Hamilton 
and Vincent Hamilton 
Quo-
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ADDENDUM, 
Ruling, dated March 27, 2007. 
Order Granting Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, dated April 17, 2007. 
Ruling, dated November 6, 2007. 
Order Granting Motion to Enforce Partial Settlement Agreement, dated January 3, 
2008. 
Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion in Limine Regarding Evidence and Argument 
Responsive to Defendants' Affirmative Defenses, and, if Necessary, Motion for 
Order to File Reply to Answer and Final Judgment, dated January 3, 2008 
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4TH0iSTRICT 
STATE OF UTAH 
UmKCOUMTY 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AMBER MCKELVEY, individually and for 
and on behalf of HAMILTON BROS. 
ELECTRIC, INC., a Utah company, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
STUART G. HAMILTON and VINCENT 
HAMILTON, 
Defendants. 
RULING 
Case No. 050102782 
Judge Derek P. Pullan 
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Stuart G. Hamilton's and Defendant Vincent 
Hamilton's (collectively "the Hamiltons") joint Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The Hamiltons 
filed the motion and supporting memorandum on November 24,2006. Plaintiff Amber McKelvey 
("McKelvey") filed a memorandum in opposition on January 4,2007. The Hamiltons filed a reply 
memorandum on January 29,2007- The Court heard oral argument on February 12,2007. 
Having considered the arguments of the parties, the Court now enters the following: 
RULING 
Gordon Dean Hamilton died testate on January 17,1990. He was the father of two sons (the 
Hamiltons) and three daughters (McKelvey, Lisa H. Kunz, and Tonua Hamilton). His Last Will and 
Testament appointed the Hamiltons as personal representatives of his estate ("the Estate"). McKelvey 
1 
(J O £ 
and Kunz petitioned the Court to remove the Hamiltons as the personal representatives of the Estate. 
On January 21,1994, the Honorable Guy R. Burningham issued an order denying the petition 
and approving an interim distribution of the Estate. On the same date, the Court issued findings and fact 
and conclusions of law. The parties dispute the correct interpretation of Judge Burningham's order. 
At this time, McKelvey owns 1,339.33 shares of Hamilton Bros. Electric Inc. ("HBE") stock. 
The Hamiltons currently own 3,309.33 shares of HBE stock each. The Hamiltons contend that this 
distribution of stock in HBE is consistent with Judge Burningham's order. McKelvey contends that the 
Hamiltons misappropriated HBE stock from the Estate in violation of Judge Burningham's order. 
The Statutes of Limitation and Claim Preclusion 
The Hamiltons contend that McKelvey's claims are barred by the statute of limitations. First, the 
Hamiltons contend that McKelvey's claims against them as personal representatives of the estate should 
have been filed "within six months after the filing of the closing statement." Utah Code Ann. 75-3-
1005. The Hamiltons note that an "Estate Closing Order" was issued on Aprill7,2000. McKelvey 
contends that no "closing statement" has ever been filed in this action. Moreover, McKelvey correctly 
asserts that the causes of action barred by 75-3-1005 do not include "rights to recover from the personal 
representative for fraud, misrepresentation, or inadequate disclosure related to the settlement of the 
decedent's estate." Id 
In the alternative, the Hamiltons argue that McKelvey's claim "to recover property improperly 
distributed or the value thereof from them, should have been filed "at the later of... three years from 
the decedent's death; or one year after the time of distribution thereof." Utah Code Ann. 75-3-
1006(l)(b). McKelvey contends that her claim is not to recover improperly distributed property, but for 
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a declaratory judgment that the Hamiltons distributed property in violation of the orders of the court. In 
the alternative, McKelvey correctly argues that section 75-3-1005 "does not bar an action to recover 
property or value received as a result of fraud." Utah Code Ann. 75-3-1006(2). 
Whether a closing statement has ever been filed in this action is a disputed issue of material fact. 
McKelvey's claims of fraud, misrepresentation, and inadequate disclosure by the personal 
representatives are not barred by sections 75-3-1005 and 75-3-1006. However, these claims are firmly 
rooted in McKelvey's contention that the Hamiltons distributed HBE stock in violation of Judge 
Burningham's order of interim distribution. 
By the same token, if the Hamiltons violated the interim order of distribution, McKelvey's cause 
of action is different from and arose after the claims litigated in 1994. Therefore, the doctrine of claim 
preclusion would not bar McKelvey's suit. Macris & Assoc. Inc.. 2000 UT 93, f 28,16 P.3d 1214, 
1221 (for doctrine of res judicata to preclude subsequent cause of action, plaintiff must be aware of the 
cause of action at the time the first suit was commenced and the cause of action must be identical to the 
one brought in the prior suit). 
Therefore, the Court turns to the critical question—the correct interpretation of the 1994 order of 
interim distribution. 
Judge Burningham's Findings, Conclusions, And Order 
As stated, the parties dispute the correct interpretation of Judge Burningham's findings, 
conclusions, and order issued on January 21,1994. At oral argument, both counsel stipulated that the 
Court could interpret the findings, conclusions, and order of interim distribution as a matter of law. 
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Judge Burningham made the following findings of fact: 
1. The Hamiltons "were justified in not making a distribution of the [HBE] stock of 20% to 
each heir inasmuch as "not all heirs would be involved in the corporation" and for the 
reasons of pending tax audits, pending litigation, claims by Mary Hamilton, the lack of 
dividends and the personal involvement of [the Hamiltons] in the operations of the 
company. (Findings, f 14). 
2. McKelvey, Kunz and Tonua Hamilton "have had very limited involvement with the 
actual running of the corporation, while [the Hamiltons] have been actively involved for a 
period of at least twenty or more years and have been a significant factor in preserving the 
corporation as an asset for all heirs." (Findings, f 15). 
3. After Gordon D. Hamilton's death, the bonding company required personal 
indemnification from [the Hamiltons] to allow the corporation to complete pending 
contracts. The Hamiltons pledged their personal assets to meet this obligation. 
McKelvey, Kunz and Tonua Hamilton did not, (Findings, % 18). 
4. The Hamiltons were entitled to an award of $134,540.00, "a reasonable fee for their 
services" as personal representatives. 
5. The value of HBE was $841,000.00, or $84.10 per share. Implicit in this finding, is the 
finding that 10,000 shares of HBE stock were outstanding. (Findings, XI39,45(c)). 
6. The value of the total gross estate was $1,957,242.00. (Findings, f 39). 
7. The Hamiltons were permitted to hold $128,500 in reserve for attorney's fees. (Findings, 
1140). Together, the total for expenses and reserves was $1,065,577.00. Thus, the net 
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value of the estate was $891,665, or $178,333 per heir. (Findings, 1 41). 
An interim distribution of $141,508 to Kunz, Tonua Hamilton, and McKelvey was 
authorized. This represented $195,000 each—an amount in excess of the proportionate 
share of the net value of the estate—less $53,492 each in prior distributions. (Findings, 
1142,44). 
This distribution could be received in one of three ways: (1) in the form of "a distribution 
in kind pf the real property with a payment of cash to reach each heir's proportionate 
share"; (2) paid in cash and deferred cash payments "over a period not to exceed 10 years 
with six percent (6%) interest on the unpaid portion with minimum annual payments of 
not less than $20,000 "; or (3) stock in HBE. 
Unless she timely elected the cash deferred payments, McKelvey was to receive a net 
distribution in HBE stock equal to $141,508. At $84.10 per share, McKelvey was 
entitled to receive 1,683 shares. 
Kunz and Tonua Hamilton were to receive a net distribution of $141,508 in the form of 
cash and cash deferred payments. These payments were to be funded up to $20,000 jter 
year through the sale of real property in the Estate. The payments were secured by a lien 
against this property. However, in the event that no real property was sold during a 
calendar year, the payments were the personal obligations of the Hamiltons. (Findings, H 
46,48). 
The Hamiltons were to "hold [McKelvey], [Kunz] and Tonua Hamilton harmless from 
any attorney's fees and tax liabilities" which exceeded authorized reserves. Reserves for 
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attorney's fees not actually expended were to be shared equally. (Findings, U 49). 
13. "All other assets of the estate, except the reserves of $ 128,500 and the Mary Hamilton 
property, is to be distributed to [the Hamiltons] in kind, subject to terms of the cash and 
deferred cash payment [to Kunz] and Tonua Hamilton and the stock to be distributed to 
Amber McKelvey." (Findings, K 53). 
Consistent with these findings, Judge Burningham directed that an order be prepared "for 
distribution of 1,683 shares of [HBE] stock to [McKelvey], or upon timely election the sum of $141,508 
in lieu thereof, the sum of $141,508 to [Kunz] and Tonua Hamilton." (Conclusions, f 2). "All other 
property of the Estate, subject to the terms and conditions of a lien on the real properties in favor of 
[Kunz] and Tonua Hamilton, is to be awarded to [the Hamiltons]." Finally, subject to the order, the 
heirs "mutually release each other from any and all claims, demands, or actions." (Findings, K 55; 
Conclusions, % 7). 
The order of interim distribution executed by Judge Burningham is consistent with the foregoing 
findings of fact and conclusions of law.1 
1
 Both the findings and conclusions and the order were approved as to form by 
McKelvey's attorney of record. The Findings state that McKelvey and Kunz were represented by 
Michael L. Deamer at the December 28,1993 hearing. 
McKelvey states that she withdrew from the petition to remove the Hamiltons as personal 
representatives by sending a faxed letter to the court on December 27,1993. (Affidavit of Amber 
McKelvey in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, f 4, filed 
December 26,2006). She also states that she terminated her relationship with Mr. Deamer at that 
time. (Id. at J 10). 
The attached December 27,1993 letter is handwritten and states "To whom this may 
concern, I Amber Hamilton McKelvey with prejudice have settled out of court with Stuart G. 
Hamilton & Vincent C. Hamilton concerning the Gordon D. Hamilton Estate. To become 1/3 
partner with them." The word "continue" is written above "become" in the last sentence. 
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It is undisputed that McKelvey, Stuart Hamilton, and Vincent Hamilton each received 1,683 
shares of HBE stock as their initial distribution from the Estate. The Hamiltons elected to take their 
personal representative fee of $134,540 in kind, receiving together an additional 1599.8 shares of HBE 
stock (799.9 shares each). Implicit in Judge Bumingham's ruling is a finding that 10,000 shares in HBE 
stock were assets of the Estate. After these distributions, 3,351 shares remained. These shares were 
distributed to the Hamiltons equally in kind as assets of the remainder of the estate. 
The Court has carefully parsed the findings, conclusions, and order issued in January 1994. 
Having done so, the Court concludes that the foregoing distribution of stock was consistent with the 
order of interim distribution. Nothing in Judge Bumingham's findings, conclusions, or order prevented 
the Hamiltons from acquiring a larger percentage of HBE stock than McKelvey. Distribution to the 
Hamiltons "in kind"—whether for personal representative fees or as part of the residual estate—was 
expressly permitted. On this issue, the Court grants the Hamilton's motion for summary judgment. 
McKelvey argues that the distribution of HBE shares to the Hamiltons in lieu of personal 
representative fees and as part of the remainder of the estate violated HBE's bylaws. Therefore, the 
distribution is void. Specifically, McKelvey contends that these shares should have first been offered to 
HBE for redemption, and then to her as a shareholder on the same terms that the estate was willing to 
transfer them to the Hamiltons. Whether the transfer of these shares to the Hamiltons violated HBE 
bylaws and the effect of that violation is likely a mixed question of law and fact. McKelvey raises the 
The court docket shows that the only thing filed between December 21,1993 and January 
10,2004 was the minute entry for the December 28,1993 hearing. The Court apparently did not 
receive McKelvey's fax at that time and did not receive a withdrawal of her counsel. 
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issue in defense of the Hamiltons' motion for summary judgment, not as an affirmative basis upon which 
summary judgment should be granted in her favor. Therefore, the Court need not reach the issue at this 
stage of the proceedings. 
Finally, whether McKelvey sold 237.81 shares of HBE stock to the company in 1996, or received 
a loan secured by those shares is a disputed issue of material fact. As to this issue, the Court denies the 
Hamiltons' motion for summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants in part the Hamiltons' motion for summary judgment. 
The Court requests that counsel for the Hamiltons prepare an order consistent with this ruling. 
DATED this <&7 day of March. 2007. 
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Order prepared by: 
Mark O. Morris (4636) 
Stewart O. Peay (9584) 
Snell & Wilmer L.L.P. 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Gateway Tower West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1004 
Telephone: (801)257-1900 
Facsimile: (801)257-1800 
Attorneys for Defendants Stuart G. Hamilton 
and Vincent C. Hamilton 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, AMERICAN FORK DIVISION, STATE OF UTAH 
AMBER McKELVEY, individually and for I ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 
and on behalf of HAMILTON BROS. PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ELECTRIC, INC., a Utah Company, 
Plaintiff, | 
vs. I Case No. 050102782 
STUART G.HAMILTON and VINCENT Honorable Derek Pullan 
C. HAMILTON, 
Defendants. 
Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment came on for regularly scheduled 
hearing on February 12,2007. Mark O. Morris appeared on behalf of the Defendants, and 
Christopher R. Hogle appeared on behalf of Plaintiff. After having considered the parties' 
Memoranda and evidence submitted therewith, after hearing and considering the argument of 
437342.1 
counsel, and in accordance with the March 27,2007 Ruling entered in this case, the Court finds 
as follows: 
1. Disputed issues of fact preclude summary judgment on the statute of limitation 
grounds set forth in Defendants' Motion; 
2. The doctrine of claim preclusion does not bar Plaintiffs claims herein; 
3. By stipulation of counsel, the January 21,1994 Findings, Conclusions and Order 
("Order") may be interpreted as a matter of law; 
4. Following the Order, Plaintiff and Defendants each received 1,683 shares of Hamilton 
Brothers Electric stock as their initial distribution from their father's estate ("Estate".) 
5. Defendants elected to take their personal representative fee, authorized by the Order, 
in the form of stock, each receiving 799.9 shares; 
6. Because there were 10,000 total shares of outstanding Hamilton Brothers Electric 
stock prior to the above distributions, there remained approximately 3,351 shares which, 
pursuant to the Order, were distributed to the Defendants equally as remaining assets of the 
Estate; 
7. The issues of whether any transfers of shares to the Hamiltons violated the bylaws of 
Hamilton Brothers Electric, the effect of any such violation, and whether Plaintiff reduced her 
share ownership in Hamilton Brothers Electric through a loan transaction with the company, are 
not before the Court, and no decision is rendered thereon. 
Based upon the foregoing findings, and pursuant to the March 27, 2007 Ruling in this 
case, 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECREED that Defendants' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment is Granted such that the Court finds, as a matter of law, that the post-Order 
distribution of 1683 shares of stock to Plaintiff, and 4,158.5 shares to each of the Defendants, 
was authorized by and consistent with the Order. 
Dated this Jt_ day of April, 2007. 
Approved as to form 
Holme Roberts and Owen, LLP 
Christopher R. Hoglc^ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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STATE OP UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AMBER MCKELVEY, individually and for and 
on behalf of HAMILTON BROS. ELECTRIC, 
INC., a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STUART G. HAMILTON and VINCENT 
HAMILTON, 
Defendants. 
RULING 
Case No. 050102782 
Judge Derek P. Pullan 
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Stuart G. Hamilton's and Defendant Vincent 
Hamilton's (collectively "the Hamiltons") joint Motion to Enforce Partial Settlement Agreement. The 
Defendants filed the motion and supporting memorandum on or about August 2, 2007. Plaintiff Amber 
McKelvey ("McKelvey") filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion on September 25,2007. The 
Defendants filed a reply memorandum on or about October 9, 2007. The Court heard oral argument on 
October 15,2007. 
Having considered the briefing and arguments of the respective parties, the Court now enters the 
following: 
RULING 
Undisputed Facts 
1. In early 2004, McKelvey's former counsel (Mr. Ben Hathaway) contacted counsel for the 
Hamiltons (Mr. Mark Morris) and proposed that (1) the parties jointly agree upon and pay for a 
business valuation expert who could render an opinion on the value of Hamilton Bros. Electric; 
and (2) the parties limit the issues before the court solely to the issue of what percentage of 
Hamilton Bros. Electric, Inc. McKelvey owned. 
2. Mr. Morris memorialized this proposal in a letter dated February 24,2006. At the close of the 
letter, Mr. Morris wrote: 
If I understood [the proposal] correctly, do you contemplate forwarding to 
me a stipulation and order consistent with that proposal? As I indicated to 
you on the telephone, my clients [the Hamiltons] agree to this proposal. 
(Morris Letter, 2/24/06, Hamiltons Memo, Exhibit B). 
3. Within one week, Mr. Hathaway proposed the names of two business appraisers for the 
Hamiltons' consideration and produced each appraiser's resume. At that time, Mr. Hathaway 
wrote: "Please contact me at your first opportunity so we can more formally set out the procedure 
toward resolution of the parties dispute." (Hathaway Letter, 3/1/06, Hamiltons Memo, Exhibit 
C). 
4. Twenty days later, Mr. Morris wrote to Mr. Hathaway confirming that the Hamiltons "need not 
respond to the Second Amended Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint." The reason stated 
was that "we have reached an agreement in principle that most of the claims set forth therein are 
going to be effectively dismissed and released when our clients enter into an agreement leaving 
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the share of ownership as the sole remaining issue to be litigated in the case, and agreeing to an 
evaluation of the company that the parties will agree to be binding for purposes of any buyouts 
that would follow from a judicial determination of Amber's ownership." (Morris Letter, 3/21/06, 
Hamiltons Memo, Exhibit D). 
5. The March 21,2006 letter from Mr. Morris is the first mention of the business evaluation being 
binding upon the parties for purposes of any future buyouts. The Morris letter closes: "I look 
forward to seeing your draft of those documents." Id. 
6. Approximately one month later, on April 17,2006, Mr. Morris forwarded to Mr. Hathaway a 
"proposed partial settlement agreement and related pleadings." (Morris Letter, 4/17/06, 
Hamiltons Memo, Exhibit E). These documents reflected ctthe agreement I think our clients have 
reached to resolve their corporate issues." Id. 
7. In his affidavit, Mr. Hathaway denies that the parties reached the settlement agreement reflected 
in these documents. Specifically, he asserts that: 
a. The written settlement agreement was—as stated by Mr. Morris—merely a "proposed 
partial settlement agreement." He states that he "had suggested . . . that the process might 
be expedited if [Mr. Morris] would kindly 'take the first crack' at drafting settlement 
documents." (Hathaway Affid., T[ 4). 
b. After receiving the documents, Mr. Hathaway informed Mr. Morris that they were not 
acceptable "in their present form." (Hathaway Affid., U 5). 
c. Mr. Hathaway states that "it was never my understanding that the Hamiltons and Ms. 
McKelvey came to an agreement on the terms included in the [settlement documents], or, 
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for that matter, on any terms beyond a general concept of terms for an approach toward 
resolving the pending litigation." (Hathaway Affid., f 6). 
d. Mr. Hathaway asserts that no agreement was reached as to the consequence of the 
appraisal—(i.e. whether either party would be required to buyout the other, or whether 
the appraisal would be binding on the parties for purposes of any such buyout). 
(Hathaway Affid. fflf 7-8). 
e. Mr. Hathaway asserts that no agreement was reached as to "whether or not the claims and 
counterclaims of the parties would be dismissed, if at all." (Hathaway Affid., ^ 9). 
8. The parties had scheduled interviews with proposed appraisers for May 24,2007. However, 
counsel for McKelvey withdrew on May 19,2007. 
9. McKelvey retained present counsel. She denies that she reached any agreement to narrow the 
issues in this case or to dismiss any of her claims. 
The Hamiltons' Arguments 
The Hamiltons request that the Court summarily enforce their partial settlement agreement 
reached with McKelvey. The terms the agreement were (1) the parties would jointly hire and pay for a 
business appraiser; and (2) the parties would litigate only one issue—the percentage of McKelvey's 
ownership in Hamilton Bros. Electric, Inc. 
The Hamiltons contend that these terms are definite and unambiguous. McKelvey, by and 
through here counsel of record, proposed these terms and the Hamiltons accepted. The fact that the 
agreement was not ultimately reduced to a signed writing is of no legal consequence. Goodmansen v. 
Liberty Vending Systems* Inc. 866 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah Ct App. 1993); John Deere Co. v. A&H Equip. 
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Inc.. 876 P.2d 880, 886 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Finally, McKelvey's subsequent conduct evidences her 
intent to be bound by the agreement. Specifically, McKelvey (1) proposed two business appraisers to 
evaluate Hamilton Bros. Electric, Inc.; (2) amended her complaint to include a claim for declaratory 
relief relating to her percentage of ownership in Hamilton Bros. Electric, Inc.; and (3) agreed that the 
Hamiltons need not answer the amended complaint given the agreement that most claims plead therein 
would ultimately be dismissed. 
McKelvey's Arguments 
McKelvey contends that the evidence offered by the Hamiltons in support of the purported partial 
settlement agreement is hearsay and therefore inadmissible. In the alternative, McKelvey argues that the 
Hathaway affidavit presents conflicting evidence regarding the existence of a settlement agreement 
between the parties. Under these circumstances, it is "for the jury to determine whether a contract did in 
fact exist." Ohara v. HalL 628 P.2d 1289,1291 (Utah 1981). In sum, "there is no meeting of the minds 
where the parties do not intend to contract and the question of intent is generally one to be determined by 
the trier of fact." Id, quoting, Household Utilities v. The Andreiss Co., 236 N.W.2d 663 (Wis. 1976). 
Finally, McKelvey contends that the parties intended to defer any legal obligations until a written 
settlement agreement was prepared. Therefore, the parties merely engaged in "preliminary negotiations" 
which do not as a matter of law constitute a contract. 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Weignen 2005 UT App. 
523 K 7,127 P.3d 1241,1243, quoting, R. J. Daum Const. Co. v. Child. 122 Utah 194,247 P.2d 817, 
820(1952). 
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Conclusions of Law 
A settlement agreement constitutes a "valid and enforceable contract." Basic contract principles 
apply in determining whether a settlement agreement should be summarily enforced. Goodmansen. 866 
P.2d at 584, quoting, Mascaro v. Davis. 741 P.2d 938, 942 (Utah 1987). 
To enter into an enforceable contract, the parties must mutually assent to all essential terms. 
Mutual assent means that the parties assent "to the same thing in the same sense so that the minds meet 
as to all the terms." John Deere Co., 876 P.2d at 883, quoting, Goodmansen, 866 P.2d at 584. 
"If an intention is manifested in any way that legal obligations between the parties shall be 
deferred until [a] writing is made, the preliminary negotiations and agreements do not constitute a 
contract." 1-800 Contacts. Inc., 2005 UT App. 523, f 7. However, in the absence of such a 
manifestation, "it is of no legal consequence that the parties have not signed a settlement agreement" 
Goodmansen, 866 P.2d at 584. If a written agreement is simply "intended to memorialize an oral 
contract, a subsequent failure to execute the written document does not nullify the oral contract." Id., 
quoting, Lawrence Const. Co. V. Homquist 642 P.2d 382, 384 (Utah 1982). In other words, parties 
have no right to abandon a settlement deal "during the sometimes substantial period between when the 
deal is struck and when all necessary signatures can be garnered on the stipulation." Id. 
Finally, summary enforcement is not appropriate when "the existence of a contract is the point in 
issue and the evidence is conflicting and admits of more than one inference." O'Hara, 628 P.2d at 1291. 
In such cases, it is for the jury to decide to whether a settlement agreement was reached and upon what 
terms. 
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An overview of case law involving the enforcement of settlement agreements is instructive. In 
1-800 Contacts, the plaintiff argued that a series of emails between the parties evidenced an agreement to 
certain material terms of a contract, including the purchase price of the property and the manner of 
payment. However, one email read: "This offer... is not to be considered legally binding until a 
physical executed contract between the two companies is completed. Until the time said contract is 
executed, I may, at my sole discretion, rescind or modify this offer in any way I see fit." 1-800 Contacts. 
2005 UT App. 523, % 6. 
The Court held that "by this email, Defendant clearly and unambiguously reserved the right to^ 
modify or rescind its offer up to and until the time the parties executed a written agreement.... *[I]f an 
intention is manifested in any way that legal obligations between the parties shall be deferred until the 
writing is made, the preliminary negotiations and agreements do not constitute a contract." Id., at % 7. 
In Engineering Associates. Inc. v. Irving Place Associates. 622 P.2d 784 (Utah 1980), Irving 
Place sought a mortgage loan to convert an old high school into office space. Irving Place required a 
binding loan commitment in consideration for its commitment fee. All American Life & Casualty 
received the loan application and offered a first mortgage loan, but no binding commitment until Irving 
Place signed an acceptance, and that signed acceptance was approved by the board and/or executive 
officer of All American Life. JcL, 622 P.2d at 785-87. 
The Court held: "If the parties make it clear that they do not intend that there should be legal 
consequences unless and until a formal writing is executed, there is no contract until that time." The 
Court explained that All American Life had reserved to itself the last act in the formation of the 
contract—approval of a writing by its board or executive officer—therefore, no contract had been 
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formed. Jd, 622 P.2d at 787. 
In Goodmansen. the Plaintiff sued Liberty Vending for breach of warranty, fraud, and 
misrepresentation. On the eve of trial, a series of letters were exchanged between counsel. The first 
letter set forth the "general terms" of a settlement the Plaintiffs counsel "believed" to have been 
reached. Liberty Vending's counsel responded in writing accepting the terms, but with certain 
exceptions. Plaintiffs counsel wrote back accepting most of the modifications. Counsel for Liberty 
Vending signed the third letter approving the settlement and the trial date was cancelled. Plaintiffs 
counsel later drafted implementing documents—the promissory note, a general release, and a written 
settlement agreement—which Liberty Vending refused to execute. Id., 866 P.2d at 582-84. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision summarily enforcing the settlement 
agreement. The Court held that it was of no legal consequence that the settlement documents had not 
been signed. The "letters between [counsel] constitute^] a binding settlement agreement between the 
parties." Moreover, the subsequent conduct of the parties in canceling the trial corroborated this 
conclusion. Id, 866 P.2d at 585 
In John Deere Company v. A&H Equipment, Inc.. 876 P.2d 880 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), A&H 
Equipment had written to John Deere Company's counsel and proposed a settlement. Referencing only 
the underlying action, counsel for A&H proposed a "mutual dismissal with prejudice and a general 
release of claims with each party to bear their respective costs." Id., 876 P.2d at 882. John Deere 
Company accepted the offer at first by telephone, and later confirmed in writing through its counsel. 
John Deere's attorney prepared the settlement agreement. A&H refused to sign claiming that it had 
intended to include the dismissal of other litigation between A&H and Farm Plan, a John Deere affiliate. 
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The Court rejected A&H's contention that the parties had merely engaged in preliminary 
negotiations and that there had been no meeting of the minds. The Court held that the parties had 
initially had a meeting of the minds and A&H then changed its mind. The proposed written settlement 
agreement was consistent with the correspondence between counsel, referencing only the dismissal of 
the underlying case, not other litigation. 
A careful reading of the record demonstrates no conflicting evidence as to the existence of a 
partial settlement agreement. In his affidavit, McKelvey's former counsel states that it was never his 
understanding that the parties "came to an agreement on the terms included in the proposed [settlement] 
documents." (Hathaway Affid., ^ 6. However, he concedes that the parties agreed to "a general concept 
of terms for an approach toward resolving the pending litigation." Id. 
That "general concept" is memorialized in Mr. Morris' correspondence dated February 24, 
2007—the parties would (1) jointly hire a business valuation expert who could render an opinion on the 
value of Hamilton Bros. Electric; and (2) limit the issues now before the court solely to the issue of what 
Ms. McKelvey's percentage of ownership is. (Morris Letter, 2/24/06, Hamiltons Memo, Exhibit B). 
Through counsel, the Hamiltons accepted McKelvey's proposal. As to these material terms, there was a 
meeting of the minds. The terms are clear, definite and unambiguous. 
After striking this deal, the parties acted in conformance with their agreement. McKelvey's 
counsel proposed the names of two business appraisers and produced their respective resumes. 
Appointments with the appraisers were scheduled. McKelvey filed the Second Amended Verified 
Complaint adding a cause of action for declaratory relief determining her percentage of ownership in 
Hamilton Bros. Electric. Through counsel, the parties agreed that the Hamiltons need not answer the 
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Second Amended Complaint because they had "reached an agreement in principle" to try only 
McKelvey's percentage of ownership, and by necessary implication to forego all other claims and 
counterclaims. 
It is undisputed that the parties intended to memorialize their oral agreement in a writing. On 
March 1,2006, McKelvey's counsel requested that Mr. Morris contact him so "we can more formally set 
out the procedure toward resolution of the parties' dispute." Twenty days later, referencing the parties 
agreement, Mr. Morris wrote that he "looked forward to seeing [Mr. Hathaway's] draft of those 
documents." Sometime prior to April 17,2006, the burden of taking "the first crack" at drafting these 
documents shifted to Mr. Morris. (Hathaway Affid., TJ 4). Mr. Morris prepared the documents and 
forwarded them to McKelvey's former counsel who found them to be "unacceptable in their current 
form" (Hathaway Affid., f 5). Significantly, unlike the parties in 1-800 Contacts and Engineering 
Associates, the parties in this action did not defer their legal obligations until the contemplated writing 
was prepared and executed. 
The fact that the parties failed to hammer out the language of the writing memorializing 
McKelvey's proposed resolution is of no legal consequence. Likewise, McKelvey's refusal to execute 
the settlement documents does not nullify her prior oral agreement with the Hamiltons. McKelvey 
struck a deal in early 2006 and cannot change her mind now that she finds the deal unacceptable. In this 
respect, this case is strikingly similar to Goodmansen and John Deere Company. 
Finally, no agreement was reached as to the binding effect of the business evaluation for 
purposes of future buyouts. Mr. Morris' February 24, 2007 letter is silent on this question. The issue is 
first raised in Mr. Morris' March 21,2006 letter where he writes that the business evaluation would be 
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"binding for purposes of any buyouts that would follow from a judicial determination of Amber's 
ownership." Significantly, the written settlement agreement which was drafted by Mr. Morris does not 
address whether the evaluation would be binding in the event of future buyouts. Rather, it simply reads 
that: "Neither the Hamiltons nor McKelvey will make any payments to each other as a result of this 
Agreement." (Settlement Docs, % 6). 
The binding effect of the business evaluation is not an essential term of the partial settlement 
agreement. For whatever reason, McKelvey decided early in 2006 that presenting to the Court only one 
issue—her percentage of ownership in Hamilton Bros. Electric—would be an acceptable resolution of 
the case. In proposing this resolution to the Hamiltons, she secured the dismissal of the Hamiltons' 
counterclaims as well as the Hamiltons' contribution toward the costs of a business evaluation. That 
evaluation may inform future buyouts negotiated between these parties. However, whether future 
buyouts ever eventuate and at what price are not issues material to the determination of McKelvey's 
percentage of ownership in Hamilton Bros* Electric. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Hamiltons' Motion to Enforce Partial Settlement Agreement is 
granted. Counsel for the Hamiltons shall prepare an order consistent with this Ruling. 
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Stewart O. Peay (9584) 
Snell & Wilmer L.L.P. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, AMERICAN FORK DIVISION, STATE OF UTAH 
AMBER McKELVEY, individually and for 
and on behalf of HAMILTON BROS. 
ELECTRIC, INC., a Utah Company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STUART G. HAMILTON and VINCENT 
C. HAMILTON, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
ENFORCE PARTIAL SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT 
Case No. 050102782 
Honorable Derek Pullan 
Defendants' Motion to Enforce Partial Settlement Agreement came on for regularly scheduled 
hearing on October 15,2007. Mark O. Morris and Stewart O. Peay appeared on behalf of the 
Defendants, and Christopher R. Hogle appeared on behalf of Plaintiff. After having considered 
the parties' Memoranda and evidence, after hearing and considering the law and arguments of 
469080.1 mz 
counsel, the Court entered its November 6,2007 Ruling granting the motion, the findings and 
conclusions of which are incorporated herein. This Court finds that there are no genuine issues 
of material fact as to the enforceability of the partial settlement agreement reached between the 
parties in early 2006, that the agreement is enforceable and should be enforced, and that 
Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this issue. Accordingly: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECREED that Defendants' Motion to Enforce Partial 
Settlement Agreement is granted; and 
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED AND DECREED that all causes of action, 
claims and counterclaims between the parties in this action are hereby dismissed with prejudice 
and on the merits, with the exception of Plaintiffs claim for a declaratory judgment of her 
percentage ownership interest in the parties' corporation, which issue the Court has resolved 
separately. 
Dated this _3_ day of Decegibfiiv2©e^r ( 
Approved as to form 
Holme Roberts and Owen, LLP 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
c 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, AMERICAN FORK DIVISION, STATE OF UTAH 
AMBER McKELVEY, individually and for 
and on behalf of HAMILTON BROS. 
ELECTRIC, INC., a Utah Company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STUART G. HAMILTON and VINCENT 
C. HAMILTON, 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION IN LIMINE REGARDING 
EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENT 
RESPONSIVE TO DEFENDANTS' 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES, AND, IF 
NECESSARY, MOTION FOR ORDER TO 
FILE REPLY TO ANSWER AND 
FINAL JUDGMENT 
Case No. 050102782 
Honorable Derek Pullan 
Plaintiffs Motion in Limine Regarding Evidence and Argument Responsive to 
Defendants' Affirmative Defenses, and, If Necessary Motion for Order to File Reply to Answer 
468471.4 yy.n 
came on for regularly scheduled hearing on December 6,2007. Mark O. Morris and Stewart O. 
Peay appeared on behalf of the Defendants, and Christopher R. Hogle appeared on behalf of 
Plaintiff. After having considered the parties' Memoranda and evidence submitted therewith, 
after hearing and considering the argument of counsel, and in accordance with an oral ruling 
issued from the bench on December 6,2007, the Court finds as follows: 
1. The parties to this action are the shareholders of Hamilton Bros. Electric, Inc. (the 
"Corporation"); 
2. Each of the parties obtained their shares in the Corporation from the Estate of 
Gordon Dean Hamilton, their father; 
3. Plaintiff has alleged throughout this action that the Defendants have mismanaged 
the Corporation and that she has been damaged by their actions; 
4. Plaintiff filed her Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint on October 4,2004, 
her Amended Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint on August 11, 2005, and her Second 
Amended Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint on March 20, 2006; 
5. Defendants filed their Answer and Motion to Dismiss Causes of Action Two and 
Three on November 8, 2004, their Answer to Amended Verified Shareholder Derivative 
Complaint and Counterclaim ("Answer and Counterclaim") on August 31,2005, and their 
Answer to Second Amended Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint on February 23,2007; 
6. In their Answer and Counterclaim, Defendants took the position that their equity 
interest in the Corporation came from their father's estate and resulted from the January 21, 1994 
Order Denying Petition to Remove the Personal Representatives and Granting Interim 
468471.4 
Distribution ("Order") and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ("Findings and 
Conclusions") entered by the Court in the Matter of the Estate of Gordon Dean Hamilton, Civil 
No. 903400101, in the Fourth Judicial District, Utah County, State of Utah. Defendants attached 
a copy of these documents to the Answer and Counterclaim as exhibits; 
7. In November 2005, in response to interrogatories propounded by the Plaintiff, 
Defendants stated that their equity interest in the Corporation was based upon the Order and 
Findings and Conclusions; 
8. In her March 20,2006 Second Amended Verified Shareholder Derivative 
Complaint, Plaintiff for the first time brought a cause of action for declaratory judgment and 
asked the Court to determine the extent of her equity interest in the Corporation; 
9. In February 2006, the parties reached a partial settlement agreement which 
resolved all claims and counterclaims alleged in this action except for Ms. McKelvey's claim 
regarding her equity interest in the Corporation; this settlement agreement was enforced by the 
Court in its November 6, 2007 Ruling re Motion to Enforce Partial Settlement Agreement. 
10. In November 2006, the Defendants moved for partial summary judgment on 
McKelvey's share ownership claim based upon the Order and Findings and Conclusions and 
certain statutes of limitations - Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-3-1005 and 75-3-1006(b)(ii); 
11. Plaintiffs opposition to this motion included new claims that the Order and 
Findings and Conclusions had been procured by an alleged fraud perpetrated on the Court prior 
to entry of the 1994 Order, and that the Defendants had distributed the Corporation's shares in 
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violation of its bylaws. Plaintiff had never before raised these issues in any pleading or 
discovery; 
12. In an April 16, 2007 Order, this Court granted Defendants' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment finding that the Order and Findings and Conclusions were dispositive of the 
issue of the parties' stock ownership in the Corporation, except for Defendants' claim that 
Plaintiff had forfeited shares by failing to repay a $20,000 loan from the Corporation (See April 
16, 2007 Order Granting Motion for Partial Summary Judgment); 
13. By agreement of the parties, the Defendants did not have to answer the Second 
Amended Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint until February 2007; 
14. In their February 23,2007 answer, Defendants pled as affirmative defenses to 
Plaintiffs declaratory judgment cause of action the Order and the Findings and Conclusions and 
statute of limitations found in Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-3-1005 and 75-3-1006; 
15. Plaintiffs current motion for leave to present evidence that Defendants 
perpetrated a fraud on the Court during the action that resulted in the 1994 Order and Findings 
and Conclusions would result in allowing Plaintiff to amend her pleadings to bring a new 
affirmative cause of action to set aside the Order and Findings and Conclusions; 
16. At the December 6, 2007 hearing, Plaintiff conceded that the April 16, 2007 
Order effectively disposed of her contention that Defendants' receipt of the Corporation stock 
was voided by the Corporation's bylaws. 
17. As part of the February, 2006 partial settlement agreement that Defendants 
advanced and this Court found to exist, Defendants withdrew their August 31,2005 
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counterclaim. Defendants5 claim that Plaintiff allegedly forfeited shares by failing to repay a 
$20,000 loan from the Corporation is one of the claims that Defendants agreed in the partial 
settlement agreement to withdraw. 
Based upon the foregoing findings and the law of this case: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECREED that Plaintiffs Motion in Limine 
Regarding Evidence and Argument Responsive to Defendants' Affirmative Defenses, and, If 
Necessary, Motion for Order to File Reply to Answer is hereby denied, because the issues that it 
attempts to raise are affirmative claims that have already been resolved in this litigation, and any 
additional amendments on these issues would be untimely and unduly prejudicial; 
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED AND DECREED that Plaintiff has been on 
notice of Defendants' assertions that the parties obtained their equity interest in the Corporation 
by virtue of the Order and Findings and Conclusions since no later than August or November 
2005, and there is no basis to allow her to amend her pleadings at this late date; and 
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED AND DECREED that as a result of other orders 
entered by this Court, all of Plaintiff s causes of action and all of Defendants' counterclaims are 
resolved. 
Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 54 U.R.C.P., the Court hereby enters Final Judgment 
dismissing all remaining claims and counterclaims with prejudice and on the merits, all parties to 
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bear their respective attorneys fees. Bills of Costs, if any, should be filed in accordance with 
Approved as to form 
Holme Roberts and Owen, LLP 
Christopher R. HOgle 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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